CHAPTER 6

THE ASCENDANCY OF THE 'SERVICE ETHIC'

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The militancy aroused during the 1918 postal strike and by the resistance to classification and reorganization did not simply fade away to be replaced by forty years of relative quiet.[1] The dynamics of social action were not related to only one side of a conflict. Just as employers in the United States were able to adjust to the 'new unionism', in Canada the reaction of the government to civil service unrest had a determining effect on the course of events. If in 1918 the western postal workers learned that militancy would be rewarded, the government was equally read to learn the appropriate lessons. A sympathetic strike of postal workers occurred in Winnipeg and other Western cities in 1919 during the general strike. To some extent the government's response was based on the concrete experience of the previous year, although it is possible that an isolated postal strike may not have been handled in the same manner. The success of the government's efforts influenced its handling of subsequent civil service labour trouble, as unrest continued to pervade the post office in the early 190s.

I

The Winnipeg general Strike was perceived by the government to be a potentially revolutionary situation, and its response was determined by these larger dimensions rather than simply by lessons that had been learned in the 1918 postal strike. To some extent, however, the government treated the postal strike as a separate incident in the overall strike situation. Nevertheless the postal workers decision to join the general strike did not have its roots solely in sympathy, but occurred against the background of local grievances and national unrest over the classification procedures. The government, for example, had promised that reclassification bill would be brought down in the House on May 1, 1919. Postal workers, most likely believing that the revised salary adjustments would be in accordance with the rising cost of living, were angry when the bill was delayed, a fact which "most decidedly contributed to the men's willingness to be caught in the trouble".[2] When the postal workers in Winnipeg did strike, they drew up a list of grievances which ostensibly were the cause of the action.[3]

The postal employees in the west were reported as having resolved to strike on April 1. The executive of the Toronto branch of the DPCA wrote an open letter to every

cabinet member which indicated that Toronto letter carriers were in sympathy with the agitation for a strike. The letter predicted that, once started, a strike movement would sweep Ontario and the west and in Toronto would involve postal clerks as well. During the 1918 strike, the Toronto executive explained, difficulty had been encountered "in restraining the members of this Association from joining." Because of the extreme dissatisfaction which had been "aggravated by the apparent indifference of the government . . . this committee fears it will not be able to restrain the members from joining in any action which may be taken at the present time."[4]

It was also true that the postal locals were in affiliation with the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council, and when the general strike began, had declared themselves ready to strike if called upon.[5] If the 1919 strike was caused by both specific grievances and genuine sympathy, the government took the position that the list of grievances was merely a justification for joining the strike.[6] In their reaction to the walkout, however, the cabinet members handled the postal workers as though it was a separate incident.

As Bercuson shows, the action taken in 1919 was very much in contrast to the government response in the previous year. The Deputy Postmaster General, R. M. Coulter, believed that the strike of the Winnipeg Postal Workers was directly related to the failure of the government to adopt a hard bargaining line in 1918.[7] In that year Crothers had spoken directly to the representatives of the strikers and addressed the men. In 1919 Senator Robertson and Arthur Meighen consulted only with the local authorities and postal officials after their arrival in Winnipeg on May 21.

On Friday, May 23, an ultimatum was issued to the striking postal workers. Unless the men returned to their work by Monday, May 26, and severed relations with the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council, they would be dismissed from the service, "lose their pension rights and be barred from future employment in the public service."[8] The government did not wait until Monday but began immediately hiring strike breakers. On Monday only about forty strikers returned to work and the rest were dismissed from the civil service.[9] The government had carried through with the action which it had only threatened in 1918.

In response to the dismissals the railway mail clerks voted on May 27 to strike in sympathy. Thirty of their number refused to walk out, and these were joined in the cars by new temporary employees and supervisory personnel. Under a similar ultimatum from Robertson the clerks capitulated. They received "permission" from Minister of Labor Robertson to return to work and agreed that temporary help hired during the brief strike would be permitted to remain.[10]

The Central Strike Committee condemned the dismissals and protested by sending a telegram to Borden. The Prime Minister responded by giving his support to the position taken by Robertson, and added that "postal employees in other western cities before any

strike took place had been notified that 'abandonment of their public duty, obedience to the direction of another authority and participation in a sympathetic strike' would mean their permanent retirement from the public service." The government, he concluded, "cannot reinstate men who had deserted their posts in such circumstances."[11]

Reorganization of the Winnipeg Post Office proceeded rapidly during the first week of the strike as returned strikers were joined by new employees. Volunteers were gradually relieved of duty and the wicket service resumed.[12] Reorganization was practically complete by June 1, although letter carrier service could not be resumed because of the "hostile attitudes of citizens sympathetic to the strike". Many strikers, realizing that the ultimatum was in earnest, applied for reinstatement, in some cases offering to renounce their union connection. Robertson, however, refused to rehire the penitents.[13]

As the sympathetic strike spread westward, postal workers in Calgary and Saskatoon joined despite the government's position taken at Winnipeg, and Borden's threat that the policy of dismissal would apply throughout the region. The postmen in Calgary voted on May 23 to strike and walked off three days later.[14] The workers were immediately dismissed and the post office run by volunteer labour. Following this reaction, the attitude of the workers took on a more conciliatory tone. At a Federated Trades meeting, a postal employee expressed the opinion that he would be "only too glad to return to his job if he only could".[15]

Altogether in the three western cities about six hundred postal workers lost their positions. The Amalgamated Postal Workers began immediately to have their members reinstated. A delegation, which included L. Pickup from Winnipeg, interviewed the Prime Minister on the 27th of June. On the following day the Amalgamated wrote an open letter to all Members of Parliament, requesting that the Government "adopt a policy of magnanimity and conciliation" and thereby eliminate the "bitterness of mind which otherwise must prevail in the future."[16] In his reply Borden stated that the government had clearly indicated the course of action which would follow postal employee strikes in the west. The men had deliberately chosen their course and completely disregarded their public duty. The government could not, in the public interest, change its set policy.[17]

At its 1919 convention, the TLC requested that the government immediately reinstate the strikers, since such an action would illustrate the desire of the government to promote industrial peace.[18] The postal employees had two separate grievances: those strikers who were re-hired at a lower classification than they had originally obtained, pressed the government to pay beck the money lost by the temporary down- grading; and those who were temporarily or permanently 'black- listed' made efforts to be re-employed by the post office.

Much correspondence was carried on between the ex-employees and the new Prime Minister, Arthur Meighen. The official attitude adopted by the ex-strikers in their letters

was that they had made "one slip" which they regretted sincerely. R. McWhirter, for example, complained of being "one of those who innocently suffered, and is still suffering, by efforts used at that time, threats and antagonism, when I made efforts to go on duty."[19]

H. L. Rogers, who was reported officially to be a "chronic grouch and a dangerous agitator" with an unsuitable past record[20], wrote the Meighen in 1921 claiming that "our chief regret is that the government ever allowed us to be affiliated with the Trades and Labor council which placed us in the position we found ourselves in 1919."[21] W. Brend, one of the dismissed strikers, sent a series of letters to Meighen in 1919 and 1920. A wounded returned soldier, he argued that they had merely followed the will of the majority in going on strike. As arguments in his favour, he indicated that he had refused to do picket work, and attempted to return to work when a ban was placed on the distribution of milk and bread. Brend listed his family church, and the service organizations of which he was a member and asked forgiveness for the "mistake" that he had made. The government, he pleaded, should not condemn forever and those who deserved it should be re-employed. His request was a modest one: to be again employed, not to be reinstated.[22]

W. J. Boyd similarly wrote a series of letters to the Prime Minister in which he requested that the "older ill-advised servants" be given an opportunity to re-establish themselves and become faithful servants and good citizens.[23] In 1920 Boyd was officially described as being "a very safe man now" who would "never cause any more trouble over labour difficulties."[24]

In early January, 1920, the government decided to selectively re-hire the ex-strikers. Since many of the men sincerely regretted the action they had taken and recognized the "gravity of their offences against the state", the Cabinet decided to "exercise clemency as far as reasonably consistent with discipline." Provision was made that ex-strikers could be rehired under the condition that the Cabinet gave its approval, and satisfactory assurances were obtained that " a repetition of the offence will not occur."[25] The men were taken on as 'new employees' and were required to pass the necessary civil service examinations before their positions were made permanent. They were denied seniority rights and were started at the bottom scale of each class. Promotion was declared to be dependent upon satisfactory diligence.[26] Those that were refused a position were told only that their past record did not warrant their re- employment. This prompted demands that the post Office Department be specific about the content of the charges and by whom they were laid.[27]

As the postal strikers were either re-hired or found employment elsewhere, the issue of the 'black-list' slowly disappeared. The most pressing grievance remaining was the loss of pay brought about by the demotions. Throughout the 1920s efforts were made by the postal organizations and the TLC to have this lost money paid beck to the workers. The oppression of the postal employees also took other forms, which equally prompted protests.

On behalf of the ACSC, J. W. Wilton, a Winnipeg Barrister, filed an application in June 1927 with the Postmaster General requesting a Royal Commission to investigate the question of the salary readjustment and other grievances of the employees. Besides having to pass departmental examinations of major and minor sortation tests and grade exams conducted by the district examiner, one of the major grievances of the Winnipeg Clerks was that they were "required to pass a speed test conducted by the Local Supervisor in which a far higher standard of speed is set than is imposed by the Department," as well as various examinations during the year known as 'monthly tests'. The tests had to be passed to the satisfaction of the Postmaster before an increase in salary could be granted. This resulted, the clerks claimed, in local discrimination. In order to recommend a postal worker for a promotion the postmaster had to assert not only that the employee had rendered satisfactory service but that he had actually increased his usefulness. With the last word resting on the subjective judgement of the postmaster, this procedure was also the source of local discrimination.[28] The government dismissed these charges with the usual argument that only inefficient employees and those not fully conversant with the regulations and duties would fear such examinations.[29]

The settlement of the last grievance related directly to the 1919 strike took a full decade to be achieved. On 14 June 1929 a Bill was introduced providing for a readjustment of the salaries of the men who were demoted after the strike, "paying them for service actually performed as from the date of their employment at the rates of remuneration paid to other employees for similar services."[30] Even this settlement was the occasion of further difficulty: the government included only permanent employees when the Bill was implemented, and it took another year to extend the provisions to temporary employees.[31]

The success of the government's response to the postal strike in 1919 was to form the model for subsequent action. While the attitudes expressed by the strikers in their supplications to Meighen may not be generalized to other postal workers, the indication seems to be that the government response in fact was instrumental in promoting more conservative attitudes in the west.

One of the lessons which the postal organizations learned from the 1919 strike was the necessity for joint action and unity. Even before the 1918 strike the disunity of the service was thought to be disadvantageous to the workers, and a single postal organization had been proposed. The organizational split that took place following the 1918 strike increased the disunity of the service and provided further impetus efforts to achieve amalgamation or federation.

II

The notion of postal amalgamation -- one organization for the entire postal service --

had been current prior to the formation of the APW. The Civilian, in discussing the question, outlined three steps to eventual amalgamation, the first being local joint committees and the second being the federation principle.[32] Following the split in membership, Frank Grierson of the CSF made an early plea for reconciliation and a new unity. The most injury, he declared would be done if the breach were unhealed, for postal workers had more in common across Canada then they had differences. The differential response in 1918 he attributed to temperamental and environmental causes. The west attributed a "cautious, politic, tactful temperament . . . to the East as being due to its close propinquity to the seat of government." On the other hand, the east viewed the western workers as having a "wild and woolly spirit" which had led them into impetuous action.[33] This interpretation was to be somewhat shaken in the events of 1924.

The formation of the APW as we have seen, gave a practical necessity to the federation question in the east. Westerners took the view that Amalgamation had in fact taken place and that the interests of all postal workers would be to join in the movement: "King Capital is never happier than when he perceives a skirmish among his slaves. He knows that their minds are not then wholly cantered upon their common enemy."[34]

In opposition to this idea, on November 15, 1920, the DPCA and FALC formed the Canadian Federation of Postal Employees, membership of which was open to all Dominion-wide postal organizations. The Federation was formed to co-ordinate the activities of the affiliated bodies in their efforts to bring improvements to the service.[35] In October of that year the Dominion Railway Clerks' Federation joined the new organization.[36]

Discussions between the east and west with the object of again unifying the postal organizations were held between the various associations, the first in Ottawa in 1922 and the second, in the spring of 1923, in Winnipeg. The 'eastern' associations proposed that one postal brotherhood be formed to combine the three separate organizations, which would continue to maintain separate existences and memberships, and that the ACSC should disband its postal sections with these workers joining the appropriate postal organizations. The ACSC proposed in turn that the three separate organizations be disbanded and form into one enlarged postal branch of the Amalgamated. They were prepared to go so far as to discard the new constitution and abandon the principle of civil service unity if the three association co- operated in forming one genuine postal organization.[37]

Neither organization was willing to accept the proposal of the other, and since no workable compromise could be devised, the talks were broken off. The Postal Federation itself was an uneasy alliance, and the branches perceived major differences in the conditions of work between the various classifications, as had been indicated by their response to the classification. As Logan suggested, "the letter carrier, with this interest on the physical requirements of his 'beat' and good co-operation and facilities for sorting his

load, has usually little consciousness of common ground with the 'inside' postal clerk with this problems of night work and Sunday work."[38] The Postal Federation did not last very long' its bread-up was brought about in no small part by difficulties surrounding the 1924 postal strike. If the 1918 postal strike achieved postal amalgamation in the west, the 1924 postal strike temporarily halted efforts in the east to form a viable postal brotherhood.

III

Throughout the first half of 1924 salary negotiations had been conducted between the government and the Postal Federation, with salary proposals being put forward by both the Department and the Federation.[39] By Order in Council, the CSC was instructed to prepare a revised salary schedule for the post office. Pressure for an upward revision came from the staff associations, and the postal organizations backed up their demands with the threat of a strike.[40] The CSC took its task seriously and independently, and its new salary schedule was based on a conception that its major responsibility was to the public as a whole. Claiming that the government had instructed an 'eye to economy', the CSC argued that it had not been difficult to obtain sufficiently qualified employees at the presently existing minimum.[41] the recommendations were actually lower than both the employees' demands and the department's offer, and reduced the amount of pay which the postal workers were then receiving:[42] Postal helpers lost a yearly average of $75, while letter carriers lost $17, postal clerks $60 and railway mail clerks $50.[43]

The government appears to have made several attempts to amend the salary schedule, but the CSC refused to reconsider. The Department of Justice ruled that the Cabinet could only accept or reject recommendations from the CSC but could not amend them. On June 9 the government decided to accept the new revision.[44] This incensed the postal workers, and amid attempts by the Federation to renegotiate with the Cabinet, the agitation for strike action intensified, and strike votes were conducted across the country.

The Dominion Postal Federation established its strike headquarters in Toronto, and vote results from the nearly 10,000 postal employees began to arrive. All branches were unanimous in rejecting the CSC's revision, although there was a mixed reaction to the strike issue. In places such as Toronto both the letter carriers and the postal clerks voted to strike. In other areas there was less enthusiasm, although most agreed to strike if necessary. The probability of a coast-to-coast walk-out was increased when the ACSC endorsed the action of the Federation, and appeared ready to strike.[45]

On Tuesday, June 17, the Federation declared that the results of the strike votes were "beyond expectations" and a strike dead-line was announced for five o'clock in the afternoon on the next day. The government maintained its position that the CSC's award would be its last offer. In an attempt to break the impasse and revive negotiations, R. A.

Stapells, President of the Toronto Board of Trade, telegrammed to Prime Minister King requesting resumption of talks.[46]

Stapells received a reply Tuesday evening inviting the Federation executive to Ottawa for conferences the next day. After lengthy deliberation, the executive boarded the mid-night train for Ottawa. Meetings were held on the 18th with Charles Stewart, the Acting Postmaster General, and James Murdock, the Minister of Labor.[47] At these eleventh hour negotiations the government agreed to supplement the CSC awards, although even the new proposals meant that the employees would still draw less than they had the previous year.[48] At fifteen minutes to five the executive emerged from the meeting having decided to postpone the strike action for twenty-four hours. The government's offer and the countermanding order were telegraphed to all branches from Ottawa. Neither acceptance nor rejection of the government's offer was recommended.[49]

Coming at the time it did, the new order caused considerable confusion. Before word had been received from Ottawa, strikes had begun at five o'clock in Toronto, Montreal, Moncton, Hamilton, Windsor, and elsewhere. The receipt of the countermanding order caused some strikers in Toronto to return to work. The strike committee took a firm stand against any "further delay" and refused to recognize the order of the Federation, "except on lines laid down by the rank and file". The trip to Ottawa, they stated, had never been sanctioned by the workers. In the face of this pressure from the postal workers the executive, upon its return from the Capital, decided to rescind the second order and reinstated the original strike deadline. Disagreement within the executive over this decision caused the secretary, J. Archer, to resign. He counselled workers in several Ontario cities to accept the government's offer and return to work.[50]

At the beginning of the strike instructions were issued from Ottawa that postmasters were to give their employees until ten the next morning (Thursday, June 19) to return to work; otherwise they would be dismissed and replaced. Protection was promised for those postal employees who remained on the job. Advertisements for 'postal helper' appeared almost immediately in the press. In Toronto postmaster Lemon began reorganizing the post office planning to utilize the new employees in a simplified sorting the distribution system. "A dozen white-collared Post office official volunteers buzzed around the mail trucks, loading bags . . . and sorting them."[51]

Contrary to the indications before the 18th, the strike movement failed to pick up momentum. Little disturbance was reported from the Maritimes or the West, and in several places where the postal workers had initially left work, they quickly returned. The strike was confined to Ontario and Montreal, with postal workers remaining out in Toronto, Montreal and Windsor.[52] The railway mail clerks had been slow in taking a strike vote, and the Chairman of the Postal Federation, himself a railway mail clerk, believed that they would not take part. They experienced a temporary change of heart, however, and in

Toronto voted to participate in the strike.[53]

It was in Toronto that the strike had its centre and where the walkout was most complete, with 1400 men on strike. The employees decided to ignore the government's ultimatum, and delegations were sent to Ottawa and Hamilton in an attempt to revive the spirit in these cities. Four hundred strikers motored to Hamilton in an effort to persuade the postal workers there to join them. In Toronto, committees were formed to visit those who were not on strike to persuade them to leave work.[54]

Very early in the strike Lemon had hired 576 new helpers, who were joined by twelve ex-strikers who were also hired on as 'helpers'. Other inexperienced applicants were turned away, as the difficulty of attempting to train so many new workers proved chaotic. Some mail was sent to Ottawa where clerks working over time sorted the material. In Montreal, where the strike was less successful, 500 men had attempted to force their way into the post office to attain employment.[55] On the 23rd Lemon was authorized to recruit his staff up to full strength, although few additional helpers were hired on.[56]

With capitulation being the norm outside of the three cities, the railway mail clerks voted to return to work and by the 20th rail service had been restored.[57] Since its ultimatum, the government had taken the position that he strike was officially over. Those who were still absent from their posts had simply read themselves out of the civil service, and were considered ex-employees. Upon this basis no further concessions were offered by the government. Despite these difficulties, the Toronto workers maintained their spirit and even increased their demands, declaring that the government would have to pay them for the time they were on strike. by the 26th only sixty-nine strikers had returned to work, according to Lemon's announcement.[58]

In Windsor the postmaster had initially adopted a very hard line, declaring that anyone who could read and write would be given a position which, depending on their individual merits, could become permanent.[59] On June 20 it was reported that "fair service" had been maintained in Windsor, although no letter carriers were employed. While none of the strikers had reported for duty the postmaster had been supplied with all the help that the needed.[60] The strike situation was reported that police protection and had been provided for the strike breakers.[61] By the 23rd very few of the new employees remained at work: the remainder had been "intimidated by the strikers". Public sentiment it was admitted, was "strong against bringing in outside help".[62] The Toronto Globe reported that out of one hundred men who had been interviewed in Windsor by the employment bureau, only one would accept work in the post office, " and he was afraid to pass the pickets stationed by the strikers in front of the post office."[63]

In Toronto many marches were held ending in demonstrations in Queen's Park where the men were addressed by their strike leaders and other sympathizers. One such march was led by the wives of the striking postal workers. As many as 6.000 people

attended the outdoor rallies.[64]

As the strike entered its ninth day with the government giving no sign that it was fully prepared to compromise, the workers decided to lower their demands. They would accept the proposed adjustment to the CSC's offer and await the full revision for the entire service, and they would also accept the sub-committee of Cabinet which it was proposed would investigate their grievances. They wanted assurances however, that they would be reinstated with full seniority and pension rights.[65] Negotiations were conducted between the King government in Ottawa and the Federation, with Dr. J. H. Cascaden, President of the Toronto Liberal Association, as mediator.

At a meeting of the men, Cascaden informed them that he had assurances from the government that if they returned to the post office unconditionally and signed on as 'postal helpers', they would then be reinstated and more than fairly treated.[66] Jackson, Chairman of the Federation, explained the terms to the strikes and said that they would be paid for the time they were on strike. The unconditional return was only a temporary obstacle to allow the government to 'save face', and everything would be ironed out, Jackson explained, as soon as the men returned to the employ of the post office and were no longer strikers.[67] While the settlement was not in writing, the postal employees' representatives urged the men to accept the conditions and declared their faith that the government would love up to its verbal commitments. The strikers deliberated for three hours, and then voted to return to work. At 6:30 in the evening on the 29th 1400 postal workers marched in ranks to Station "A" in Toronto, headed by two men bearing union jacks, two pipes and a drummer.[68]

The return to work was more difficult in Montreal. Postmaster Gaudet claimed that he had received no official word as to the termination of the strike, and having no orders to let the strikers in, threatened to charge them with trespassing. Jackson informed Ottawa of the difficulty, and by July 2 all former employees had been taken on as postal helpers.[69] The Windsor workers followed the lead of the strikers in Toronto and returned to work at the same time.

IV

Despite the existence of a great deal of sentiment, coast- to-coast, in favour of a strike before June 18, when the strike began it failed to gain momentum and was confined to three eastern cities. While unanimously opposing the CSC salary cut, many postal workers were not prepared to go on strike. Some long-time employees rejected the idea of a strike because there was no fund to support them, and they would be unable to pick up work.[70] Many feared that by striking they would jeopardize not only their position but their provisions for old age as well.[71]

Much confusion had been created by the vacillation of the strike leadership. Having

been summoned to Ottawa at the last minute, the federation executive attempted to rescind its strike order when it was too late in some regions. The government's compromise offer was announced at the time the strike was scheduled to begin and it had the effect of confusing the workers who were on strike and dampening militancy in the workers who had yet to take decisive action. While many post offices were struck on the 18th, the news of the government's offer and the contradictory orders from the Federation, caused the majority of postal workers to return to work. In Toronto the strike had strong rank and file leadership which was the principal reason for the continuation of the strike. The decision of the Federation executive to restore the original strike date further deepened the 'muddle' and exposed the dearth of competent leadership. The split in the executive further confused the issue. The strike only continued in centres where there was well developed rank and file militancy.

In the west, branches of the ACSC had endorsed the action of the eastern postal workers and several strike votes were conducted prior to the 18th. As the strike erupted in the east, however, no corresponding action was taken in the west. This was partly caused by the difference in time zones, since the five o'clock deadline had not been passed before the news arrived that the government had made a new offer. The President of the ACSC took the position that a strike should not have been called while negotiations were still underway.

In addition, the negative experiences of the western postal workers in the 1919 strike had developed feelings of repentance on the part of some of the postal employees. Winnipeg workers decided not to strike because, as J. Thompson, the Provincial Vice President of the DPCA explained, the conditions in that city "placed the local men at a grave disadvantage as compared with the workers in the eastern points. The postal workers in Winnipeg had accepted the uncertainties of a strike in 1919, and with so many factions as a hang-over from that period, an attitude of greater caution was generally favoured."[72] In addition the ACSC was not represented in the Postal Federation which was a rival organization. The movement towards co- operation in the period before June 18 was brought about by the extremity of the situation which demanded unified action. The government compromise defused the situation and afterwards the ACSC was able to send a delegation to Ottawa to present arguments for salary readjustment.

The legitimate grievance which the strikers had initially created much public and business support. The conflict between the CSC and the Cabinet placed the postal workers, for a time, in the position of the innocent victim. The government had yet to fully learn the necessity of good public relations, of giving the appearance of fair play and 'appropriate procedures' which would solidify their position and appear to place the employees in the wrong. The strike issue developed prior to the 18th in an atmosphere of general press and public support for the employees, support which they attributed to the justice of their cause

and the patience they had exhibited in refraining for so long from drastic action.[73] While placing the blame for the up-coming strike on both parties, The Globe criticized the government for evading its responsibility. Parliament, not the CSC was the supreme body, The Globe editorialized; by accepting the CSC's revision the government gave an objective indication that it was exactly what the government had wished.[74] After the strike began the paper did not take sides, and the two servants of the people were castigated for warring with each other. Since the strike had been marked by confusion and misunderstanding, both parties were counselled to accommodate to the other.[75]

The business interests of Toronto would be directly affected by a work stoppage in the post office. Prior to the 18th the Toronto Board of Trade had met with other business interests to discuss efforts to prevent the strike from taking place. R. A. Stapells, the president of the Board, consulted with the strikers and concluded that the offer of the CSC was inadequate to the needs of the men. It was through Stapells that the eleventh hour negotiations were arranged, and he travelled with the Federation executive to Ottawa "to at least lend the moral support of the business and financial interests and of the public generally of Toronto in bringing about a settlement".[76]

Notwithstanding the resumption of negotiations, the strike began on the 18th in several cities as scheduled. After that point the Board of Trade became less identified with the cause of the strikers as feelings prevailed that both parties were equally responsible. As the strike continued in Toronto the postmaster was unable to provide adequate mail service and some businesses were forced to close down temporarily. as communications broke down the business community complained more vocally of its losses.[77]

The local Liberal Association gave some support for the postal workers. On several occasions they sent telegrams to the government, one of which advised that the civil service commissioners should be dismissed.[78] It was through the mediation of Dr. Cascaden of the Liberal Association that the final negotiations were concluded which ended the strike. Support came from other sources as well: for example, a rate payers' association in Toronto passed a resolution asking the government to reinstate the strikers.[79]

The Church also played a mediating role in the strike. While the postal workers were off the job in Toronto, the Social Service Workers of the Anglican Communion in Canada and the United States were in conference in the city. They appointed a committee to investigate the 'crisis' which met first with Mackenzie King and James Murdock, the Minister of Labour, then with postmaster Lemon, and finally with the Federation executive. Several of the clergy addressed the workers in a "most conciliatory manner which paved the way for a receptive attitude towards the Government's proposals."[80]

The business interests, liberal politicians and the social activist section of the church all played the role of mediator in the dispute. Interested at first in preventing the strike and then in restoring the disrupted service, these institutions adopted the view that both sides

were wrong. Postal workers had the moral right to strike if conditions were intolerable, but the government did not have the right to impose such conditions on the people's servants.

If the postal workers obtained some moral support from these interests and had some broad popular sympathy, the most consistent source of support came from other workers. Speaking at Queen's Park, John Young, the President of the Toronto Trades and Labor Council, declared that the strike involved the interests of all organized labour. He argued that the government should not act as a strike-breaking agency but should rather act in the interests of the people, the majority of whom were workers.[81]

The Toronto street railway employees sent their greeting and sympathy to the striking postal workers. Stating that they were "proud of the city because it is a public ownership city", the employees declared that this meant "better wages and conditions for the men". These should equally apply to the postal service which was described as also being a public utility.[82] Other tradesmen, such as carpenters, machinists, railway shopmen and typographers also voiced support. Just prior to the settlement of the strike the possibility of a general sympathetic walk-out was raised in the Toronto Trades and Labor Council.[83] The Unemployed Association pledged its support and denied that any members of the association had taken work in the post office. The unemployed workers were the most vociferous advocates of a general strike in the public rallies.[84]

Workers also assisted the strikers more directly. According to G. Jackson the railway mail clerks had been at first disinclined to participate in the strike. After the strike began, however, their position became "intolerable on the road. Railroaders would spit at them and bless them with satanic terms." This pressure was behind the positive strike vote. When they decided to return to work "they felt their position keenly and returned to work reluctantly."[85]

In Montreal a letter carrier service had been begun during the strike although it did not extend very widely. letter carriers were first sent out on the 21st but had to be recalled early in the day. The carriers had been accustomed to using the public transit, but "owing to the intimidation and insults from the street railway employees" the service had to be discontinued and police protection provided.[86] Two letter carriers were later assaulted in Montreal, an action which brought members of the RCMP into the city to protect the strike breakers.[87] Letter carrier service was restored in some areas of Toronto just prior to the end of the strike and reports in the press indicated that they were subject to much ignominy. In some cases the carriers were chased by women carrying brooms.[88] Material support was provided by postal workers in the United States who voted to send money to help the situation in Montreal. $5,000 was collected and distributed in Montreal as strike pay.[89]

One of the most significant aspects of the strike was the response of the government which more closely paralleled the 1919 experience. there was no longer any doubt as to whether postal workers would strike, and the government was prepared in advance for its

occurrence. A CSC memorandum had predicted that the strike would be confined to Ontario and possibly Montreal. The postmasters were requested to advertise the positions of postal helper, at $85 a week, give the candidates oral exams, and prepare lists of such candidates for duty when this became necessary.[90] In Ottawa on the 17th some applications were received from unemployed workers who anticipated a strike.[91]

The government was fully prepared to make a fight out of the strike and not give in to the militancy. One Cabinet Minister remarked that if the postal workers persisted in their attitude, "they may place themselves in a position where parliament can do only one thing -- and that might be the one thing the postal workers do not desire." Charles Stewart, the acting Postmaster General, spoke less bluntly: the employees who go on strike, he warned, should be prepared to "shoulder the consequences".[92]

As the strike commenced, a Minister spelled out the meaning of these threats by declaring that no striker would be permitted to return to his position. The government was fully prepared to meet "the challenge of the men" and improvise measures to restore the postal service. Charles Stewart notified all postmasters to give the ten o'clock deadline and to dismiss those who did not respond. In areas where the strike continued the postmaster was to attempt to devise alternative postal arrangements with the help of new employees hired on at the minimum salary.[93]

The government's plan was to dismiss the strikers and remove them completely from the civil service. Beginning then with an official position that there was no strike, but only a large number of ex-employees, a new staff would be hired. the intransigence of the government, coupled with the dismissal and replacement of the employees, were designed to compel many of the strikers to return to the service. The strike could then be broken and the postal service resumed with weakened trade unions to represent the men.

A key role in the government's posture of intransigence was played by the Minister of Labor, James Murdock, describing the events of the strike several months after the fact, Murdock related that "he knew how the men on strike did not usually think, and knew how to deal with them." He had telephoned the strikers in Toronto to ask how long they intended to remain off the job and received the reply that they would stay out until the government gave in to their demands. Murdock replied in turn that if that was their position, "you'll stay out until hell freezes over."[94] This remark incensed the workers and Murdock came in for a great deal of verbal abuse at the public rallies. [94b] James Murdock was originally a union man. He worked as a trainman for the CPR, and served as the Canadian Vice-President of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen between 1905-1921 and 1926-1933. In the interim he served as the Minister of Labour (1921-1925) in the King Government. In 1930 he was appointed to the Senate. J. K. Johnson (ed.) The Canadian Directory of Parliament 1867-1967 (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada, 1968), p. 382.

With the exception of a brief reference to the proroguing of parliament on July 19,

1924, there were no entries in the King Diaries between May 14 and July 26, 1924. King complained of fatigue and pressure from work (July 27, 1924).

As the strike continued there was no indication that either side was willing to soften its attitude. The post office, however, was in an increasingly chaotic condition and businessmen were suffering a loss of trade. contrary to expectations, there was not a flood of men attempting to return to work -- relatively few men in Toronto capitulated and returned to work before the general decision was made. both sides gave indications that t a compromise would be acceptable. The Federation accepted the governments offers but wanted to be guaranteed reinstatement and full pension and seniority rights. The government maintained their basic position that all strikers would have to return unconditionally and sign on as postal helpers, but intimated through their representatives that this was merely a formality in order not to 'lose face.' The government's position implied that they had in fact won the strike and humbled the employees -- the strikers returned on the government's terms.[95] They had gained practically nothing from the strike that had not been previously offered, and the verbal promises of reinstatement simply restored the status quo ante.

Nevertheless, the workers had extracted a verbal pledge from the government which was in contradiction to the hard bargaining position which the Cabinet had taken in the beginning. Deeds were to prove more important that words, however. As the government was slow to restore the workers to their previous positions, Jackson complained of the delay and stated that the men were showing remarkable patience and relying on the word of the Federation that they would be treated justly. He alluded to the precedent established in 1918 and requested that the government pay the strikers for the time they were on strike -- an act he thought would go a long way toward reconciliation.[96] Reverend Spence, shocked at the way the postal workers were being treated, wrote an open letter in which he held Cascaden responsible for misleading the workers, especially on the issue of receiving pay for lost time. Cascaden denied the allegation that the had ignored the misinformation given to the men by Jackson at the time of the settlement, and declared that if it had been said there was certainly no authorization for it.[97]

The government not only refused to consider the 'precedent' of 1918, but intended to publish the workers in other ways. All temporary personnel served a six month probationary period at the end of which their sort was evaluated and the decision made to retain or release them. Forty temporary employees in Toronto who had not served their first six months had gone on strike. The Deputy Postmaster General proposed to release these men on the grounds that they had proven themselves unfit to be postal workers.[98]

On July 14 the government laid down its conditions for reinstatement. Those new employees hired during the strike were permitted to remain if, as individuals, they proved satisfactory.[99] Those who went on strike and subsequently returned would be kept on the

staff as postal helpers, at a salary of $85 per week, until September 1, 1924. If they performed satisfactory service during that period they would be reinstated at the position they had vacated. If they did not give satisfactory service they would be granted one month's salary in lieu of notice and released from the service. Those who formerly occupied the most senior posts would be "eligible to compete" for them.[100] some of the strikers were 'black-listed' and their applications to become candidates for the postal helpers' examination were refused.[101]

The Ottawa Journal Press gave an indication that not all press opinion was favourably disposed to the workers. Condemning the Toronto press for siding with the strikers, the editorial expressed the belief of the paper that Toronto should suffer a little longer:

"A great many people in Canada will be disposed to let Toronto stew in its own juice . . . . Has anybody outside of Toronto suffered very much because the mail service in Toronto has been upset through a stupid strike? Let those who directly or indirectly encourage public servants to adopt an intolerable course stew for awhile in the mess that has resulted."[102]

The postal employees expressed great indignation over the breaking of the 'gentleman's agreement', and in Windsor the local postal workers were ready to strike again in protest. The reaction, however, was not sufficiently intense to lead to another walk-out. The government had defeated the strike and won the peace as postal workers were not inclined as a body to resume the strike. In Toronto the returned strikers wore "PO85" buttons to distinguish them from the strike breakers who were still employed -- the "85" referred to their weekly salary as postal helpers.[103] James Murdock declared sarcastically that he had it "very much to heart to see such fine, loyal, intelligent, educated men going back in a big bunch willing to accept the pittance of $85 per week, which the men agreed to accept . . . .[104] It is worth pointing out here that the tactics adopted by the Liberal King government to suppress public service strikes were similar to those adopted by the previous Conservative administration of Meighen.

The railway mail clerks responded to the strike by withdrawing from the Federation and from affiliation with other postal unions. the DRMCF had opposed to the attitude of President Jackson, which had not been in accordance with the desires of the mail clerks. At its May, 1925, meeting, the railway mail clerks passed a resolution requiring an eighty percent majority of both the members and the executive before strike action could be undertaken.[105]

At the 1924 TLC convention, animosity between branches erupted. A Kitchener representative criticized the role of the TLC in the strike, and a Toronto postal worker retorted that the opportunity for assisting the strike had been to join it while it was still on. The TLC defended its role by claiming that the Federation had not requested its assistance

until the strike had begun, and a spokesman for the Congress detailed the steps the TLC had taken to negotiate with the government.[106]

The disciplinary action taken by the post office was a major grievance of the reinstated workers. The postal employees attempted to obtain reimbursement of the amount lost because of their temporary demotion. At the 1924 annual meeting, of the TLC the Toronto District Labor Council introduced a resolution protesting the payment of helpers' wages to experienced men, the penalizing of the strikers, the dismissal of employees who participated in the strike, and the "compelling of strikers to educate strike breakers in the performing of their duties as Civil Servants". The resolution recommended the dismissal of the strike breakers, and the removal from office of Deputy Postmaster General Underwood "whose influence can only be regarded as inimical to the best interests of the Postal Service". the convention accepted the resolution with the exception that the reference to Underwood was deleted by the resolutions committee.[107] The FALC requested that the government grant amnesty to the strikers, and asked that "no financial loss . . . accrue to those who exercised a right which every British subject is entitled to."[108]

No government action on the matter was forthcoming for two years. On 22 March 1926, a delegation of postal employees waited on the Postmaster General, and were informed that the government had decided to repay the money that were informed that the government had decided to repay the money that had been lost by the strikers between their re-employment as 'helpers' and their reinstatement on September 1. The moral correctness of the penalty was reaffirmed: "it is not pretended that the striking employees had any legal right to be paid at a rate other than that upon which they agreed to return to work, and it is only on compassionate grounds that the matter can be given consideration." The settlement was offered "as tangible evidence of the desire of the government to engender in the postal service the fullest possible measure of good will and harmony" and thereby finish "an unpleasant chapter in the history of the Canadian postal service."[109]

V

The postal workers were clearly the most militant sector of the Canadian Civil Service. The CSC had been charged with the responsibility of revising the salary schedules of the entire service and had begun with the postal department. If the postal workers had received substantial gains then the pressure would be overwhelming to generalize the new rates to the service as a whole. it was with this consideration that the CSC acted miserly with its recommendations. On the other hand, in order to make the staff association manageable, it was necessary to indicate forcefully that only the use of appropriate channels would bring success, and that resort to 'illegitimate' means would be confronted and defeated. If the postal workers could be compelled to toe that line, the remainder of the civil service would learn vicariously the appropriate lesson. Consequently the government adopted a 'hard line' and refused to make concessions, and once the strikers

had returned to work, repudiated in practice any verbal promises of fair treatment. To some degree, then, the government defeated the militancy of the civil servants and not until the Second World War did unrest again became potentially disruptive.

If employer-employee co-operation prevailed in the civil service by the middle 1920s, an important opposition continued to exist which retained some measure of an earlier radicalism. The Amalgamated Postal Workers, at the inception of the organization, had formed a rival of the three 'eastern' postal unions. When its efforts to affiliate with the TLC had been defeated, principally through the action of the DPCA which was granted jurisdiction from coast to coast, the APW had expanded its scope to include all Dominion civil servants, and tried to affiliate with the CSF [110].

At the convention of the APW in Victoria in 1921, a new name and constitution was adopted based on the proposition that problems could not be most expeditiously handled with a departmental of occupational basis of organization, but rather with one single service-wide association. There was a need for unity on common issues, and the extension of the CSC's control to the outside service meant that there was essentially only one employer for the whole service.

ederal employees in departments other than the post office had formed a single association in B.C. and had affiliated with the CSF. Prior to its 1921 convention the APW had conducted a referendum among these employees and determined that the majority of them favoured a single dues-paying organization of all civil servants. Consequently when the ACSC was formed, the B.C. federal employees disbanded and joined the Amalgamated.[111] Objectively the ACSC had become the rival of the Civil Service Federation.

The original executive of the ACSC represented six departments: Post Office, Immigration, Fisheries, Agriculture, Public Works, and Mines and Resources. the majority of its members were postal workers.[112] The new constitution provided for one amalgamated body representing all departments, branches and grades, and any employee of the Dominion government who had served six months was eligible for membership.[113] It provided as well for many branches, departmental and inter-departmental local units in each district[114] which gave practical content to the principle of developing broad, democratic, local control. the Amalgamated was a reaction against the 'sectionalism' that kept the service divided, and attempted to create one united service which would put an end to the mentality of "craft consciousness and class distinctions" in government employment.[115]

The attempt of the ACSC to create one nation-wide postal organization has been described above. The opportunity to engage in common practice in 1924 was rejected by the western postal workers in their refusal to go on strike. some efforts were made to 'raid' the Toronto and Halifax locals of the FALC in 1929, with the result that some postal

workers in Toronto joined the Amalgamated.[116] By 1933, however, the ACSC and the Postal Clerks' were making common representations on working conditions to the government.

The ACSC had been refused affiliation to the CSF on two grounds. One of these was jurisdictional, since the FALC was affiliated with the CSF. According to the Secretary of the Amalgamated, Fred Knowles, Alex McMordie of the letter carriers told him voluntarily that the only reason the FALC had affiliated was to prevent the ACSC from doing so.[117] the second fundamental difference was the organizational basis of the two associations. The ACSC advocated one single dues-paying organization comprised of all civil servants, while the Federation represented a number of independent 'class' or departmental organizations.[118] The Amalgamated manifested an 'industrial unionism' in the civil service, which prompted the CSF to label it an 'OBU' and engage in some 'red-baiting' which prompted mildly polemical replies.[119]

In the fall of 1929 the President of the CSF, V. C. Phelen, went on a 'western tour' into the heart-land of the Amalgamated, and in open meetings presented the Federation's point of view. while he subsequently reported that the membership of the rival organization had been depleted by ten or twenty percent, (portents which presumably indicated "the early demise of that body"),[120] the ACSC was able to maintain its strength. Nevertheless, consistent with its more 'trade union' character, its completeness was considerable less than the CSF which continued to represent the majority of organized civil servants.

The ACSC was intended to operate along 'trade union' lines, and was recognized as a trade union by at least one section of the Canadian labour movement. The All-Canadian congress of Labour had issued an invitation to the CSF for affiliation in the months preceding June 1929. The Federation had rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was inconsistent with tits constitution. With this decision as a background, the ACCL later reacted strongly to the CSF's claim that the FALC was unique in being the only body of civil servants constituting a trade union. In response the Canadian Unionist, the official journal of the ACCL, referred to the Federation as a 'company union' and a 'debating society of government employees'. The reference to the FALC was defined as an "ill-concealed slam at the ACSC" by suggesting that it was not a 'trade union'. For the ACCL the hallmark of trade unionism had never been affiliation to the TLC described as the "A.F. of L.'s Canadian subsidiary".[121] Nevertheless, the ACSC did not make a move to affiliate with the ACCL until the second world war when the vote to affiliate was lost by a narrow margin.

The basis of the pro-labour orientation of the ACSC was located in its membership. The majority of the members were postal workers, either clerks or letter carriers. The leadership during these years also came from carriers (such as Fred Knowles and President Christian Sivertz). Other civil servants, who joined the union, as we have indicated above,

were generally lower paid clericals. It would seem, then, that the 'trade union' character of the organization was directly linked to the class position of its membership and leadership. As such it functioned as an opposition to the CSF. Several examples can provide the flavour of its opposition.

Civil service organizations had been attempting for decades to obtain adequate superannuation privileges, and in 1924 the government passed an act to this effect which was greeted with delight by most civil servants. The Amalgamated demonstrated what the CSF termed "their patent belligerence" and criticized the act claiming that the "contribution is excessive in proportion to the allowance". The ACSC referred to the provision as "as act to provide funds for the Government wherewith to cover extravagances in quarters not named" and proposed that it be rejected in Toto. The CSF condemned this "impractical and immature' policy and advocated that the correct tactic was to accept the act and modify it carefully over time.[122]

In 1926 all civil service organizations had agreed to demand a $300 increase from the government, to be paid to all grades. The government's decision had been to pay $120. Shortly after this announcement, "vociferous and ill-tempered protests from locals of the Amalgamated began to pour into Ottawa. The Organizer called the offer "an insult" and roundly condemned it. The ACSC protested by sending wires to the Ministers and MPs, and by holding local protest meetings which presented the case of the civil servants to the press. Telegrams were dispatched from these meetings to the government.

The CSF took the position that the maximum attainable had been reached, and while regretting that it had not been larger, had "expressed satisfaction that the government had at least partially met the claims of the Service." The attitude of the ACSC was condemned, and it was claimed that the union was opposed to the increase. Knowles had advocated the withdrawal of the offer of $120, but only in favour of a unified demand from the whole service that the increase be greater.[123] The Federation was more closely involved with the government's reasoning the interest -- one of the effects of employer-employee co-operation -- and in the 1920s its moderate approach gave every indication of being the most successful.

In 1929 the Federation was successful in obtaining an agreement from the government to establish an enquiry into civil service salaries. The Beatty Commission, which had formerly investigated professional and technical services, was re- constituted and its terms of reference expanded to embrace the whole service. The ACSC opposed the commission, which led the CSF to again conclude that the ACSC was against salary increases. The main plank of the amalgamated platform on salaries had been the granting of a minimum salary of $100 per month. Their opposition was based on a belief that the commission merely delayed establishing this minimum, the necessity for which had been "adequately proved" by the ACSC.[124]

In the 1930s the government had reduced civil service salaries by ten percent. In January 1935 the Federation was willing to accept a restoration of half of this amount.[125] The ACSC refused to accept this offer and criticized the CSF of being "in cahoots" with the government in an attempt to stifle the aims of the civil servants. The ACSC charged that the government was attempting to 'buy off' the Federation, in particular the postal unions, and that the Federation was co- operating. The CSF demonstrated the logic of company unionism when it wondered how the Amalgamated hoped to be successful when it made such allegations.[126]

The ACSC also advocated joint councils in the civil service -- their conception, however, was that these would be advisory in nature and deal with 'general principles' rather than act as an executive body.[127] All questions "where adjustments cannot otherwise be affected" would be referred to the council,[128] making it, in their view, a dispute resolution mechanism. This was clearly a more conservative conception than that advocated by the defunct AFEO -- it was, however, more consistent with the demands made by the postal unions.

The Amalgamated Civil Servants of Canada, then, functioned as the voice of opposition in the late 1920s and during the 1930s. The service was not completely unified ideologically or organizationally. The Amalgamated was rooted in the lower grades of the civil service and in regions distant from the seat of the federal government. The CSF reaction to the Amalgamated was expressed partly by opposition to the divergent concepts of amalgamation and unionism, but also according to its own class and regional snobbery. This is clearly evident in the following description, form the Civil Service Review, of a 1935 interview with the Minister of Finance:

" . . . .The second 'spokesman' for the Amalgamated [Knowles spoke first], who had come from Kitchener, sat throughout the meeting and never opened his lips, a quite common practice of Amalgamated 'spokesmen' of the type who travel thousands of miles to Ottawa and who, after telling Civil Servants back home 'all about it', are speechless at interviews. Bearing in mind the Amalgamated attitude and manner of speech perhaps their members suffer less by their officers' silence, at that."[129]

Despite the radicalism that emerged from the ACSC in the late 1920s and 1930s, the CSF was the more successful, and its reformist ideology and co-operative policies were able to bring about certain reforms. For the majority of the service, then, the period following the defeat of the 1924 postal strike was one of growing conservatism.

VI

The Associated Federal employees of Canada dissolved in 1924, and the three federal union characters were surrendered, although the Ottawa office cleaners continued

to exist as a directly chartered local of the TLC. The passing of the most radical of the staff associations was symptomatic of the success of the moderate organizations and the trend towards greater conservatism. both of these were social facts, however, and were rooted in objective conditions.

The defeat of the 1924 postal strike along with the experience of federal employees in 1919, and the harsh terms applied, against the strikers by the government, defused the militancy of the postal workers which had existed since world War One. Adopting a policy of standing firm against 'illegitimate' forms of protest and making a hard line against the most militant sector of the civil service, the government was counting on an ideological 'ripple effect' which would convince other government employees of the disadvantages of trade unionism.

Accompanying this defeat of the more radical postal workers was some objective reassertion of the differential status of the 'middle class' civil servants. One major salary revision had taken place in 1924-1925. by 1927 the CSC and the staff associations had devised a second revision. The associations had originally demanded an across the board increase of $300, and the CSC had offered $60 for the lower grades, $120 for the intermediate grades, and $180 for the higher grades. The government then proposed that the increase be limited to $120 but that it apply to all grades equally -- a position which the CSC accepted. With the possible exception of the professional and technical workers, these two revisions had bettered the position of civil servants relative to the country as a whole.[130]

The civil servants, through the CSF and CSAO in particular, had been able to achieve a superannuation system based on the principles of equal payment from both the employees and the government. According to Hodgetts this system was in advance of pension schemes which were being developed in private industry.[131] The CSC viewed the superannuation system as a "scientific system of retirement" complementary to scientific selection and scientific management.[132] According to the 1924 Annual Report of the CSC, superannuation relieves the Government of the embarrassment and extravagance of retaining the services of officers who have outlived their usefulness; creates a proper flow of promotions; renders the service more mobile; deters efficient officers from leaving the public service for private employment where emolument and opportunity may be greater; helps to attract a better class of applicants for positions in the service and in general tends to promote efficiency in every way.[133] In short, Hodgetts conclude that: "During the twenties . . . patronage was largely eliminated, some of the previously prevailing chaos disappeared, an orderly classification of positions was installed, and a superannuation system was established."[134]

The government's success in defeating the militant postal workers, coupled with the opportunity to promote reformist ideology by slowly compromising with the demands of

the staff associations during the relatively prosperous 1920s, transformed the objective situation of the federal employees and undermined the radical attempts to unionize. The remaining staff associations were strengthened as they were able to achieve some reforms. This objective change in the relative position of civil servants tended to reinforce their 'salaried class' status and undermined the identification with the working class that some 'white-collar' civil servants had begun to develop at the end of the war. In the place of this 'working class' perspective ,civil servants came to perceive of themselves more as a unique class unto themselves -- the view that public servants were in essence classless and served the whole people equally. The ideological debate which had surrounded the movement to affiliate the CSF with labour had, b the mid and late-1920s, largely been resolved in favour of the 'classless' perspective.

The CSAO and the CSF had consistently promoted the ideology of co-operation with the employer. The only difference was that after 1924 only the ACSC opposed this line, and then only in very minor, quantitative aspects. In 1920 the CSAO made it clear that its object was to make the association "an actual and integral part of the machinery of reconstruction in the Service". They were endeavouring to effect civil service reforms by approaching the authorities in a friendly and helpful spirit of cooperation . . . .

This approach had its practical successes in the 1920s. For example, the elevator operators in the CSAO had interviewed the deputy Minister in 1927 with suggestions for the improvement of working conditions. According to the Civil Service News, that official was "impressed by their earnestness, and most of their recommendations have been put into effect." The article concluded by claiming that these concessions had "produced a feeling of contentment in their work, a knowledge that their difficulties are understood and appreciated, with the result that they are endeavouring one and all to serve to the best of their ability."[136]

The CSAO claimed that its success in attaining civil service reforms was directly linked to its policy of couching requests in moderate terms and only bringing them forward after a "mature consideration" had determined that they were in the best interests of the service as a whole. It was because of the moderate rather than radical nature of the proposals that the government welcomed representations from the Association and implemented the proposals.[137]

Besides this reasoned and moderate approach to the government, the Association believed that good public relations were crucial to obtaining reforms. The civil servants could best secure the public's confidence by assiduously applying the 'service ethic' to their individual work. According to the Institute Journal, the public confidence would be won "if all members of the Civil Service were devoted to a common interest -- to curtail expense and waste, improve efficiency and service, and give a full day's work for a full day's pay."[138] In order to eradicate public misconceptions about the service it was necessary to be more

conscientious in the application to one's assigned tasks. The civil servants were instructed by their Association to put more than merely their time into their work: the civil servant should "study a little more about the usefulness and aims of his department; and be able to justify to the public at the part which he is playing in the development of his country."[139]

According to the CSAO, the civil service was composed of servants of the public, "and its members must have the large and generous view if they are to be worthy of their high calling." The aims of the civil servant were not selfish, but were to give efficient service, and any improvement which they sought in their working conditions was in order to provide even better service in the future. The Association recognized that not all civil servants were activated by this ethic of service, but it was the conscious aim of the CSAO to promote and encourage the ideology. since the public as a whole was the paymaster, civil servants ought to ally not with one class of the public, but with the public as a whole.[140]

As civil servants, whether pick and shovel workers in the Department of Public Works, or a Branch Head "who toils night and day at his desk", were the servants of the people, and this distinction between private and public employment was thought to be more profound than any class distinctions. It was the difference between serving private, sectional interests and serving the whole country.[141] The service ethic was directly related to the view of the civil service as comprising a distinct class encompassing all occupations and united within an ideology of public service.

By the late 1920s this view seems to have largely prevailed (with the possible exception of the important Amalgamated Civil Servants of Canada). The desire for a 'class spirit' was encouraged, but unlike the campaign of the AFEO, the later use of the phrase implied the development of an esprit do corps which acted to separate civil servants from other workers. Writing in the first edition of the Civil Service Review, A. C. Campbell apologised for using the work 'class', and demonstrated what he meant by using the term:
"When Smith & Co. Ltd. try to unite their employees in loyalty to the concern, the effect, if successful, is to make those employees a class and to make them class conscious . . . .
I do not know of any company, body, crowd, class that has quite such reason to be class conscious and class proud as the Civil Service of Canada. We serve the people direct, the people of the dominion of Canada . . . . We have the traditions, even in the young life of our country, of tasks the most difficult done with noble faithfulness by our elders and forerunners in the Service. If the members of any class should be humbly and hopefully determined that his loyalty, devotion and honest industry shall make him worthy of a high calling, the Canadian Civil Servant is that identical person."[142]
Campbell argued that the civil service was a unique institution that could function efficiently only if the civil servants were fit for their calling. They had to have the right temperament and point of view. They must first be organizable (presumably by such 'moderate' associations as the CSF); second, they were to be 'devotees', that is, were to look

upon public service as a permanent career; finally they had to be economically content and "middle of the road."[143]

Jean Boivin has concluded that the pro-union orientation of 'white-collar' civil servants was late in coming because "they identified psychologically with management and they considered themselves well-treated by their employees. A large number of these workers were into class-conscious in outlook; rather they were individualistic and conservative."[144] Despite the use of the 'service ethic' to promote civil service organizational unity, it was in essence individualistic. what united federal employees was the fact that they all rendered individual services to the same body of people. Ideologically, the 'service ethic' was aimed at each individual's application to his work, and was more in keeping with the nature of 'white-collar' employment. it achieved increased prominence at a time when traditional differentials, which had been to some degree undermined had tended to reappear both in fact and in the consciousness of the employees.

By 1927 the civil Service Association was claiming that dissatisfaction with the classification was purely an individual matter and that the solution rested in the power of each individual. civil servants were to perform their duties with zeal and enthusiasm, always with a view to doing their individual best at even the most menial tasks. The rewards of promotion would surely follow such diligence and reclassification and salary increases would result from individual effort.[145]

In the late 1920s the view that rewards inevitably followed hard work was given much prominence in the Civil Service News. In one edition, five 'classes' of people were listed: the world's prizes, honours, and best pay went to the 'class' of people who showed most initiative and performed their work without having to be told; the lowest 'class' could not do things right even with supervision and "is always out of a job, and receive the contempt [they] deserve".[146] That man who could lose himself in his work would surely be the one to succeed best.[147] Genius, according to the News, was "only the power of making continuous efforts . . . . There is no failure except in no longer trying. There is no defeat except from within, no really insurmountable barrier save our own inherent weakness of purpose."[148] Comforts and rewards depended on struggling for the glory of achievement.[149]

Interestingly, such observations, which were given front page prominence in the late 1920s, disappeared in this obvious from by the early 1930s. Perhaps it became at least implicitly obvious that individual effort was not necessarily the most important element and that objective circumstances provided important limiting conditions.

By the late 1920s, then, the civil service had reached a relatively harmonious plateau. The lot of the public employees had been improved relative to the immediate post-war years through conservative channels. Within this objective context, the ethics of public service and individual achievement held ideological sway. Significantly, the only major protest movement in the civil service was located in a regionally based union made up of

some of the lower clericals and postal workers. The fact that the CSAO and the CSF promoted a 'middle class' ethic of individualism does not indicate that all members shared this consciousness. what was significant was the lack of opposition and the decline of the eastern protest movements.

VII

The restoration of some of the relative benefits of government 'white-collar' employment was again undermined with the onset of the Great Depression. Promotion was stalled, pay increases taken away, salaries reduced and a policy of lay-offs implemented. In contrast to the response of civil servants to similar changes in the period following the First World War, however, there were no strikes, no substantial agitation to join the labour movement, and any unrest was directed by the staff associations through strictly legitimate channels.

The government's response to economic slowdowns had traditionally been to cut down on expenditures and attempt to balance the budget. This necessitated government reorganization and cut-backs in staff. The Canadian Congress Journal had noted in 1923 that government efforts at economy usually brought about "retrenchment by a stampede along the path of least resistance." The first to be removed from their positions, the Journal declared, were the lower grades of the clerical workers. In 1924, for example, thousands had been eliminated from the service at a time when unemployment was increasing and industries curtailing their output.[150]

Prior to decisions on staff reductions in the service as a whole, cut-backs of personnel had begun in the 1930s as a result of other government policies. The decision of the government to transfer control over natural resources from federal to provincial jurisdiction brought about the dissolution of the Department of the Interior. Early in the depression, the, a substantial number of civil servants faced the loss of their employment at a time when alternative careers were difficult to find. Altogether, 1000 Interior employees were affected, at least 600 of whom were released form the service.[151]

The response of R. B. Bennett's conservative government to the depression followed the standard pattern of retrenchment. On February 8, 1932, a ten percent salary reduction was announced for every branch of the civil service. One week later it was announced that annual increments would be withheld during the 1932-1933 fiscal year. this Salary Reduction Act was later extended until 1935.[152] In July, 1933, all positions which were at that time vacant were declared to be permanently abolished.[153] Not since the early 1920s had reductions taken place on such a large scale. Between March 1931 and October 1932 the civil service was reduced from 45,581 employees to 43,265.[154] The Civil Service News wrote that "in no period of Civil service history have so many forced retirements

been affected as during the last three years."[155] by 1934, retirements and amalgamation of government departments had been responsible for a reduction of approximately 5,000 civil servants and had produced a saving of fifteen million dollars for the government. C. H. Cahan, the Secretary of State, was quoted as saying that any further reductions would "result in the curtailment of existing services which have hitherto been deemed essential by all classes of out people."[156]

The government response was a significant attack on the civil servant's work and make situations. The federal government, however recognized some of its social responsibilities in the matter. Unlike a private company which could simply pull out of any region if it proved more profitable than remaining, the government realized that it was necessary to the least attempt to make some provisions for its employees. The CSF, CSAO and Professional Institute, realizing that the situation was precarious for the 1000 civil servants employed by the Department of the Interior, wrote letters to the Prime Minister and sent delegations to the government attempting to reach a satisfactory settlement.[157]

Most of the efforts of the staff associations were directed towards attempting to lessen the negative effects on the employees by attempting to obtain adequate retirement provisions or alternative placement. some of the employees would be absorbed by the provinces; the older workers would be superannuated; and the CSC was instructed to try to place as many of the others as possible.[158] the re-employment proved to be a difficult task, and later became impossible when the government decided to implement full-scale cut-backs. Most of the workers who were re-assigned were the lower grades of the clerical staff who were able to obtain only temporary employment. Most difficulty was encountered in placing the professional and technical workers.[159]

The government wanted the reductions to be made "without disturbance of public services, and with the minimum of hardship to employees." To implement this decision, reductions were to be made by dismissing those over sixty-five years of age whose positions would then be abolished. Staff re-organization would be carried out to ensure that service was maintained adequately.[160] Large numbers of the released civil servants, then, did not become 'unemployed' in the strict sense of the term. Rather, they were only prematurely retired from the service. The CSF was able to point with relief at the Superannuation Act which had been attained in 1924 and provided some livelihood for the civil servants who otherwise would have been "case into utter darkness". Temporary and prevailing-rate employees were not entitled to such pension rights; however, the CSF was able to obtain a gratuity for these workers.[161]

The staff association responded to the lay-offs by accepting the necessity for the, and accepting the government's right to decide how the reductions were to be right about. The CSF and the CSAO adopted the policy of attempting to make the government's decision as palatable as possible to civil servants. Sacrifices were considered necessary for the benefit

of the country as a whole, and civil servants had to be ready to shoulder their share of the 'responsibility'. The CSAO counselled married women to leave the service as one solution to the 'hard times' that the country was experiencing.[162] Part of the conservative response can be attributed to the policy of releasing aged workers who would tend to be less militant in their resistance. The younger employees protested most strongly against the loss of promotion possibilities -- which would be compensated when the service again began to expand.[163]

The CSAO maintained strictly to what it considered legitimate channels of protest and usually adopted the positive approach of suggesting policies which would lessen the burden on civil servants. With this policy, the Association was distressed to hear that some civil servants were lobbying in political circles against the ten percent pay reduction. For a quarter century, the CSAO declared, it had stayed clear of politics and avoided seeking 'political influence'[164] and civil servants were advised to refrain from any but the most "mature" representations.

By the spring of 1934 some indications were given that unemployment was being reduced, businesses were generally recovering, and government revenue increasing.[165] While the Salary Reduction Act was renewed in 1934, the government was able to provide some relief for those employees who earned less than $1,000.[166] In 1935, statutory increases were returned, and the ban on promotions was removed. Normal salaries were restored to those in receipt of salaries up to $1,200 per year, and the reduction in salary for those above this amount lessened from ten to five percent.[167] By April 1, 1937, all salaries in the civil service had been restored to normal.[168]

The recovery of employment was connected to the alteration in government strategies by which the effort to balance the budget was discarded and the government instead engaged in deficit financing. The beginnings of welfare state policies, such as the establishment of the National Employment Office, and insurance staff. According to the Civil Service Review, the Employment and Social Insurance Act brought about an increase of 3800 civil servants to administer the new machinery.[169]

In connection with the complaints of civil servants that they faced severe difficulties in the depression, the Post Office Department found very interesting a letter composed by the Amalgamated Civil Servants of Canada which was designed to sell advertising space in the 1932 Year Book. The letter was stamped 7 November 1932, and two passages were heavily underscored by the Department: according to the ACSC, the civil service "has been least affected by the depression. . . . The wages of civil Servants are of a high average. They are not haunted with the continual fear of dismissal. Wage cuts have been practically negligible in comparison with those in the employ of commercial or private interests" and the civil service payroll was declared to be "the most stable". . . in the country at the present time."[170]

Two factors were related to the conservative response in the 1930s. In the first place, the government's successful suppression of militant trade unionism in the civil service by the mid-1920s fostered an attitude that the interests of civil servants would not best be advanced by militant trade union methods. This view received a great deal of currency by the restoration of some of the privileges of the 'salaried class'. In general, during depressions the position of salaried employees improves relative to that of wage labour, but in the case of the civil service the improvement had preceded the depression. The ability of the government to adopt deficit budgeting policies, coupled with the development of Keynesian fiscal policies, placed the civil servants in a relatively secure position. The government was therefore in a position to reinforce an ideology of reformism by being receptive to responsible, moderate demands by the staff associations. These associations accepted the predominance of the employer, and promoted an ideology of individualism in work, and loyalty to the institutions of the state, which we have termed the 'service ethic'.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX

[1] 'Relative quiet' because there was a partial revival of civil service unrest, particularly in the post office, in the conditions created by the second world war.

[2] The Civilian, Vol. XII, No. 6 (May 1919), p. 299.

[3] Bercuson, Confrontation at Winnipeg, p. 133.

[4] The Postal Journal, April 1919, in The Civilian, Vol. XII, No. 5, p. 182.

[5] Charles Lipton, The Trade Union Movement of Canada, 1827- 1959 (Toronto: N. C. Press, 1973), p. 190.

[6] Bercuson, Confrontation, p. 133.

[7] Ibid., pp. 133-135.

[8] Sturart Marshall Jamieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1966), p. 178.

[9] Bercuson, Confrontation, p. 134.

[10] Ibid., p. 135.

[11] Department of Labour, Labour Gazette, Vol. 19, p. 684.

[12] Ottawa Citizen, 28 May 1919.

[13] Bercuson, Confrontation, p. 135.

[14] The Civilian, Vol. XII, No. 6 (May 1919), p. 299; Calgary Albertan, 23 May 1919.

[15] Department of Labour, File on Strikes and Lockouts, (Report of Cpl. Zaneth, R.N.W.M.P.)

[16] The Civilian, Vol. XII No. 6 (May 1919), p. 199.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Trades and Labor congress, Report of Proceedings, 1919, p. 208.

[19] R. McWhirter to Meighen, 22 December 1919, Meighen Papers, Vol. 58.

[20] CSC to G. Buskard (Private Secretary to Meighen), 15 January 1921, Meighen Papers, Vol. 58.

[21] H. L. Rogers to Meighen, 1 January 1921, Meighen Papers, Vol. 58.

[22] W. Brend to Meighen, various dates, Meighen Papers, Vol. 8.

[23] W. J. Boyd to Meighen, 13 February 1920, Meighen Papers, Vol. 8.

[24] J. Halpenny to Meighen, 13 February 1920, Meighen Papers, Vol. 8.

[25] Memorandum to CSC, Meighen Papers, Vol. 9.

[26] Meighen to Johnson, 15 March 1921, Vol. 58.

[27] Crothers to Meighen, 14 October 1920, Meighen Papers, Vol. 58.

[28] J. W. Wilton to P. J. Veniot, 17 February 1930, Post Office Department, Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 101.

[29] Report of J. W. Wilton, in Ibid.

[30] TLC Proceedings, 1929, p. 32.

[31] Ibid., 1930, p. 98.

[32] The Civilian, Vol. X, No. 21 (1 February 1918), p. 450.

[33] Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 11 (October 1918), p. 305.

[34] Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 12 (November 1918), p. 341.

[35] Labour Organization in Canada, (1920), p. 139.

[36] Ibid., (1921), p. 135.

[37] The Canadian Civil Servant, Vol. 34, No. 8 (June 1955), p. 2.

[38] Logan, Trade Unions in Canada, p. 295.

[39] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III, No.7, p. 130.

[40] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution.

[41] The Globe, 17 June 1924.

[42] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III, No. 9, p. 23.

[43] Ibid., Vol III, No. 7, p. 30.

[44] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 126.

[45] The Globe, 16 June 1924.

[46] Ibid., 17 June 1924.

[47] Ibid., 18 June 1924.

[48] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III, No. 9, p. 23.

[49] The Globe, 19 June 1924.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid., 20 June 1924.

[53] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol III, No. 9, p. 24.

[54] The Globe, 21 June 1924.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Evening Telegram (Toronto), 23 June 1924.

[57] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III No. 9, p. 24.

[58] The Globe, 23 June 1924; 27 June 1924.

[59] Ibid., 20 June 1924.

[60] H. P. McNaughton to Asst. Secretary CSC, 20 June 1924, CSC Records, R.G. 32, Vol. 395.

[61] Ibid., 21 June 1924.

[62] Ibid., 23 June 1924.

[63] The Globe, 26 June 1924.

[64] Toronto Daily Star, 24 June 1924.

[65] The Globe, 27 June 1924.

[66] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III, No. 9, p. 24.

[67] Reverend W. J. Spence (open letter), October 1924, CSC Records, Vol. 395.

[68] Canadian Labor Press, 30 June 1924.

[69] G. R. Jackson to Charles Stewart, 1 July 1924, Post office Department, Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 98.

[70] The Globe, 16 June 1924.

[71] Ibid., 30 June 1924.

[72] Ibid., 20 June 1924.

[73] Ibid., 16 June 1924.

[75] Ibid., 23 June 1924.

[76] Ibid., 18 June 1924.

[77] Evening Telegram (Toronto), 23 June 1924.

[78] The Globe, 18 June 1924.

[79] Ibid., 26 June 1924.

[80] Canadian Labor Press, 30 August 1924.

[81] Evening Telegram (Toronto), 24 June 1924.

[82] The Globe, 26 June 1924.

[83] Ibid., 28 June 1924.

[84] Toronto Daily Star, 24 June 1924.

[85] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. III, No. 9, p. 24.

[86] The Globe, 21 June 1924.

[87] Ibid., 28 June 1924.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Ibid., 26 June 1924.

[90] CSC Memorandum. 17 June 1924, CSC Records, Vol. 395.

[91] The Globe, 17 June 1924.

[92] Ibid., 18 June 1924.

[93] Ibid., 19 June 1924.

[94] Evening Telegram (Toronto), 19 November 1924.

[95] Labour Gazette, Vol. 25, p. 142.

[96] G. R. Jackson to Charles Stewart, 10 July 1924, Post Office Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 98.

[97] Toronto Daily Star, 9 October 1924.

[98] Memorandum, 8 July 1924, Post Office Department Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 98.

[99] Canadian Labor Press, 31 July 1924.

[100] Underwood to Foran, 19 July 1924, CSC Records, Vol. 395.

[101] CSC to Boucher, 1 October 1924, Ibid.

[102] Quoted in Canadian Labor Press, 15 July 1924.

[103] CSC Records, Vol. 395.

[104] Evening Telegram (Toronto), 19 November 1924.

[105] Labour Gazette, Vol. 25, p. 791.

[106] TLC, Proceedings, 1924, pp. 109-110.

[107] Ibid., p. 138.

[108] Ibid., p. 139.

[109] Labour Gazette, Vol. 26, p. 308.

[110] Civil Service Review, (June 1929), Vol. II, No. 2, p. 21.

[111] Canadian Civil Servant, Vol. 34, No. 8 (June 1955), p. 2.

[112] Ibid.

[113] The Organizer, November 1925.

[114] Civil Service Review, June 1929, (Vol. II, No. 2), p. 21.

[115] The Organizer, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (December 1928); Vol. VIII, No. 4 (January 1929).

[116] Canadian Civil Servant, Vol. 34, No. 9 (July 1955), pp. 2-3.

[117] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[118] This organizational contradiction existed internal to the CSF as well since the CSAO represented all branches and classes of the 'inside service'. This conflict led eventually to the withdrawal of the CSAO from the CSF. Together with the ACSC, an enlarged rival of the CSF was formed called the Civil Service Association of Canada. The CSAC and the CSF then merged to form the Public Service Alliance of Canada.

[119] "Some of the opponents of Civil Service Unity (which really means better conditions), at a loss for argument, have recently given evidence of rather immature mental development by childishly calling us names. We should not be surprised at this. however, while primitive minds are said to be fond of bright colours, strange to relate they never

refer to us as 'yellow', although [in reference to them] this is the first word that occurs to us." The Organizer, Vol. VIII, No. 6, (April 1929), p. 11.

[120] Civil Service Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (December, 1929), p. 173; Ibid., Vol. 2, No. 4 (March, 1930); Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 1930).

[121] Ibid., Vol. 2, No. 1 (June 1929), pp. 83-84.

[122] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[123] Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[124] Ibid., Vol. 3, No. 1 (June 1930), pp. 59-60.

[125] Ibid., Vol. VII, No. 10 (March 1935), p. 16.

[126] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[127] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 120.

[128] ACSC memorandum, Post Office Department, Miscellaneous Records, Vol. 101.

[129] Civil Service Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1935).

[130] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, pp. 128-129.

[131] Ibid., p. 166.

[132] Ibid., p. 172.

[133] CSC Annual Report, 1922, p. xiv, quoted in Ibid., p. 173.

[134] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 115.

[135] Civil Service News, Vol. 1, No. 16 (17 January 1920), pp. 1-2.

[136] Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 11 (October 1921), p. 4.

[137] Ibid., Vol. 6, No. 2 (February 1928); Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1929), p. 19.

[138] The Institute Journal, (October 1926), quoted in Barnes, Conult and Advise, p. 19.

[139] Civil Service News, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1928), p. 3.

[140] Ibid., Vol 1, No. 4 (September 4, 1920), p. 2.

[141] Ibid.

[142] Civil Service Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1928), p. 31.

[143] Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 2 (September 1928), p. 130.

[144] Jean Boivin, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector: Some Propositions on the Cause of Public Employee Unrest" in Morley Gunderson (ed.) Collective Bargaining in the Essential and Public Service (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 3-4.

[145] Civil Service News, Vol. 5, No. 4 (April 1927), p. 11.

[146] Ibid., Vol. 7, No. 2 (February 1929), p. 1.

[147] Ibid., Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 1929), p. 1.

[148] Ibid., Vol. 7, No. 4 (April, 1929), p. 1.

[149] Ibid., Vol. 7, No. 8 (August 1929), p. 1.

[150] Canadian Congress Journal, Vol. II, No. 12 (December 1923), p. 32.

[151] Civil Service News, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1930), p. 10.

[152] Barnes, Consult and Advise, p. 24.

[153] Civil Service News, Vol. 12, No. 2 (February 1934), p. 12.
[154] Civil Service Review, Vol. VII, No. 3 (December 1933), p. 44.
[155] Civil Service News, Vol. II, No. 12 (December 1933), p. 7.
[156] Ibid., Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1934), p. 9.
[157] Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 12 (December 1930), p. 14.
[158] Ibid., Vol. 8, No. 1 (January 1930), p. 10.
[159] Ibid., Vol. 9, No. 6 (June 1931), p. 10.
[160] Labour Gazette, (1933), p. 784.
[161] Civil Service Review, Vol. VII, No. 3 (December 1933), p. 44.
[162] Civil Service News, Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1932), p. 10.
[163] Ibid., Vol. 12, No. 3 (March 1934).
[164] Ibid., Vol. 10, No. 2 (February 1932), p. 6.
[165] Ibid., Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1934), p. 10.
[166] Barnes, Consult and Advise, p. 24.
[167] Civil Service News, Vol. 12, No. 12 (December 1935).
[168] Labour Gazette, Vol. 38, p. 154.
[169] Civil Service Review, Vol, 8, No. 1 (March 1935), p. 5.
[170] Winnipeg Secretary, ACSC; 7 November 1932, Post Office Department, miscellaneous Records, Vol. 101.