CHAPTER 5

THE RESPONSE TO CLASSIFICATION AND REORGANIZATION

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I Introduction

In this thesis we have defined an organization as a trade union only if it has affiliated with a trade union central body, such as the T.L.C. The Amalgamated Civil Servants of Canada, which applied unsuccessfully for a connection to the T.L.C., is the major exception. Clearly, however, there can exist great variations in the character and constitution of trade unions. We have seen, for example, that the members of the Associated Federal Employees considered it a trade union and received a charter from the T.L.C., but nevertheless had a no-strike pledge in its constitution.

Several studies have been undertaken of the interrelationships between the character of an organization, its membership size, and the class position of its members. Since the civil service contained a great variety of class positions, the concepts developed in these studies may assist our understanding of the differential responses of distinct groups of federal employees. We can ask whether there was a relationship between the character and response of civil service organizations and the class positions of their members.

The response of civil servants was related to factors other than their class position. The government response was a causal factor in both shaping employee demands and employee acquiescence, and regional characteristics tended either to sharpen militancy or curtail it. In the preceding chapter we attributed the development of a militant tradition to issues which were created by the conditions of the war, and focussed, in particular, on the war-induced inflation. This militancy occurred against the background of the enormous expansion of the state apparatus concomitant to its increased role as economic and social regulator, a heightened labour radicalism, and numerous local and departmental grievances. The response, however, equally reflected concrete changes in the work situation which to some degree affected all civil servants. The civil service was becoming increasingly business-like, and the growth of employee organizations reflected these bureaucratic changes. The single most important aspect of this process was the implementation of scientific management principles which were imposed on the public service by the government.

II Scientific Management and the Canadian Civil Service

The application of the principles of scientific organization to the Canadian civil service has been well documented.[1] In order to play a substantial regulatory role in the economy the government required an efficient, business-like organization. The application of scientific management techniques in the government departments reflected this concern. While the demand for efficiency in government was given prominence by a group of influential Toronto businessmen who thought it essential if the state was to assist in the development of a Canadian export trade,[2] the change in management ideology was also related to other domestic concerns. The Economic and Development Commission considered the government's role of assisting national growth to be crucial. The Report declared that the competition to reorganize both business and government on a scientific basis was world-wide, with a nation's progress dependent upon its efficiency. "If Canada now rises to the occasion and adopts efficient modern methods, success will be within her grasp; if she hesitates or delays, other countries will take what she might have, and the national development will be seriously retarded". The Report argued that initiative and constructive ability were not encouraged and the aggressive methods were at variance with official traditions. "Departments [of government] are merely administrative rather than constructive, aggressive and active in the promotion of national growth."[3]

The idea of governmental reform was promoted by the civil servants themselves, and prior to World War One the Civil Service Federation had shown an interest in a reorganization of the departments. Besides adequate salaries and superannuation provisions, the other explicit aims of the C.S.F. were to introduce the merit principle of appointment and promotion, and bring about internal reorganization of the service.[4] The idea of classification and reorganization, then was not imposed on a completely unwilling service. The interest that civil servants demonstrated in reform, however, indicated that the character and content of the changes were of vital interest to them, and that they expected to provide some input. The C.S.A.O. expected that by assisting the experienced classifiers, civil servants would gain knowledge which could then be utilized without outside help.[5]

During the early parliamentary session of 1914, T. W. White, a member of parliament, in conjunction with the C.S.F., had introduced two bills on organization and superannuation into the House. They incorporated the view that since civil servants understood the service best, and were in the best position to suggest reforms, they should have some voice in the decisions.[6] However, the question of reform was temporarily shelved by the government following the outbreak of the war.

By late 1917 reforms were again being seriously discussed. Members of the 'outside' service were reported to be elated over the prospect that the whole service would come under one set of regulations. The Customs Officers, for example, hoped to obtain the

advantages enjoyed by their confreres of the 'inside' service, such as statutory increases and promotions on the merit principle.[7]

The policies that the government had in mind were not necessarily to the benefit of civil servants as a whole. According to a Committee Report to the Privy Council, the public service "could be reduced twenty percent without affecting its efficiency, by proportionately increasing the hours of service, thus effecting a considerable saving to the country". The Committee recommended "an immediate reduction of fifteen percent or say 1,750 employees of the Public Services in Ottawa."[8] The Department of Militia and Defence advised the Prime Minister to appoint a board to investigate the staffing conditions and to recommend those whose services were superfluous. Anticipating high rates of unemployment following the end of the war, the Department suggested humanely that it would be best to lay off civil servants immediately, when they would still be able to find jobs.[9]

The civil service associations generally welcomed the Order in Council, PC 358 of February 1918, which placed the 'outside' service under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service commission, although The Civilian was concerned with the "loopholes and pitfalls" it contained.[10] The initial response to the Civil Service Act of 1918 was also one of enthusiasm. Despite earlier reservations, The Civilian congratulated the government, expressed feelings of "satisfaction and warm appreciation", and referred to the Act as the single most important event in the history of the service.[11] In the United States, the National Federation of Federal Employees welcomed classification, and stated that it would bring equal pay for equal work, the basing of salaries on work performed, progressive employment practices fair play in working conditions and in relation to the cost of living, improved morale, and enhance the service in the eyes of the public,[12] The 1918 act was greatly influenced by the "administrative culture" of the United States, and the definition of the merit principle adopted by the C.S.C. paralleled that of E. O. Griffenhagen who was "the acknowledged North American expert on scientific management".[13] Griffenhagen at the time was employed by the Arthur Young Company, and the initial task of classifying the Canadian service was given by the C.S.C. to this company of American experts.

Few objections seem to have been raised about the classification procedures, which involved printed cards which every civil servant filled out to describe his function. Many civil servants took the opportunity to write at length about their value to the service and the country.[14] The Civilian printed an example of the cards prior to their distribution and stated that the employees would soon "have the opportunity" of providing the formation upon which the classification would be based. Referring to Arthur Young and Company as having "undertaken and successfully accomplished many classification jobs", The Civilian declared that the C.S.C. had secured "the best assistance possible".[15] William Foran, Secretary of the Commission, was reported to be pleased with the "excellent spirit of co-operation" demonstrated by the Deputy Heads, and expressed confidence that the civil

servants would exhibit the same spirit.[16]

The acceptance of the merit principle by the employees was based on their desire to eliminate patronage and to establish more typical employer-employee relations in the civil service. The Dominion Postal Clerks' Association desired a Postmaster General who would "take an intelligent business interest in the department's affairs". To the Association this meant that in the area of personnel relations, such a Minister would "insure improved conditions of employment for all postal employees, adequate salaries", and provide better recognition of the employees' organization. "These things are essential if the business spirit and action of the department is to be in keeping with the times."[17]

A 'business basis' meant the adoption of the more modern conception of employer-employee co-operation rather than the old system of mutual antagonism. It was a rational conception of bargaining which included the needs of the institution as will as the needs of the individual workers. the D.P.C.A. was equally clear on what a 'business basis' did not mean, and criticized the then Post-master General for giving the impression that he regards the Post Office Department in the light of an ordinary, profit making, mercantile enterprise, from whose unorganized employees must be wrung the last drop of sweat and whose charges and balance sheets must be screwed up to the last penny of profit. This is the only Cabinet officer who takes such a view of his department. It is a principle that is untrue and unsound. The fact is that it is a misconception of our great government function. It is not established for profit and earning power, but in order to serve the need of the country.[18] The acceptance by the civil service organizations of the necessity to adopt the merit principle and run departments on an efficient, business-like basis, predisposed them to initially welcome and cooperate with the scientific managers.

To accept the principle that the business model ought to be adopted by the government service meant that the Associations accepted as well the principle of laying off those defined as inefficient or unnecessary. The C.S.A.O. agreed with Dr. Roche, the Chairman of the C.S.C., when he claimed that the service was over- manned, and declared this to be the "supreme evil in the Service today".[19] The Civilian argued in favour of the removal of persons who were not earning their salaries, and declared that the Civil Service Act would prevent over-manning and the retention of "unworthy or useless persons".[20]

The motivation which led civil servants to hold this view was partly based on recognition that the public viewed government employment as a form of 'feather-bedding'. More importantly it had its source in the blockage of upward mobility within government departments. Hodgetts, et al., point out that prior to the C.S.C.: "Career development and rapid advancement on the basis of merit were millennial concepts", and they quote one commentator on civil service affairs as asserting that: "Nothing short of the chief clerks being stricken by paralysis every three or four years could create any hope for the scores who were submerged in the lower classes." Many capable men were being held down "to small salaries

and subordinate rank."[21] The adoption of efficient business practices would lead to the elimination of superfluous workers, and the adoption of the merit principle of appointment would open up senior positions to ambitious subordinates.

Within nine months the 'experts' had devised a classification system for the nearly 50,000 employees of the Canadian government -- the largest scale on which such an exercise had ever been attempted. When it appeared in June, 1919, the Report listed 1,700 different classes, each with a title, definition, sample duties, minimum requirements, salary schedule and lines of promotion.[22] The immediate result was considerable uproar from civil servants of all classes. The principal criticisms centred around the complexity of the report, its handling of the salary and promotion issues, and the failure to provide for employee input.

The Arthur Young company had assumed that the war-induced inflation was a temporary phenomenon and based salary amounts according to the pre-war cost of living figures. These were to be supplemented during the extraordinary war years by ad hoc bonuses.[23] Criticisms of the Report included not only disagreement over the actual amounts but the relation of branches to each other. The recommendations proved to be the source of important grievances in the immediate post-war years when prices did not drop to the 'normal' level as defined by Arthur Young and Company.

Secondly, the classification was designed to provide for a smooth process of promotion, but with the rigid specification of skills and pre-requisites for each level, the promotion concept tended to break down in practice. That is, as Dawson somewhat ironically explained, and employee would enter the service with a grade school education and find that in order to attain promotions "he must acquire in odd moments, a university education with perhaps graduate work in certain subjects."[24]

The essential point to be made about the criticisms of the classification, however, is that the procedure violated one of the main conditions advanced originally but the civil servants -- there was no civil service input or control over the process. The real experts in Canada, the civil servants themselves, had no voice in the classification proposals. They had accepted the American classifiers at face value, but the results almost of necessity led to an enormous number of complaints and appeals. It is interesting to note that the classifiers adopted subsequently as part of their procedure some input from those affected by the process. The American civil service thereby benefited from the Canadian experience.[25]

The C.S.C. belatedly made provisions to hear appeals against the classification by establishing a board of Hearing and Recommendation in July, 1919. Department branch appeal boards were set up, with disagreements and departmental appeals being referred to the Board. Eventually, under pressure from the C.S.F. and the C.S.A.O., the Board agreed to hear personal appeals as well. Commissioner Jameson's revision of the first classification was prepared by September, 1919, and he was able to accommodate some of the objections raised by the employees. The net effect was to add an additional two hundred classes to the

classification.[26] In 1920 the C.S.C. pressed forward with its campaign to reform the civil service, and hired Griffenhagen and Associates to begin to re-organize the service. The response to these procedures was universally negative and all civil service organizations spoke with one voice in their demands to have Griffenhagen's contract terminated.

The issue was clearly not one of simple anti-Americanism; on the contrary, it was opposition to the classification and re- organization themselves, and opposition to being 'watched' as well. The civil servants were in the position of reaction to decisions and changes which came from the top down, and they responded by claiming that Canadians had sufficient "brains and experience to put their own house in order."[27] Hodgetts, et al. quote the C.S.F. and the C.S.A.O. as having "breathlessly informed Meighen in 1921" that officials felt a "daily humiliation in being subjected to the supervision . . . of foreigners. Men and women cannot be expected to go to their work with zeal when they realize that their movements are watched and noted by an alien body of mercenaries."[28] this would appear to parallel one practice in private employment of passively resisting scientific management by failing to co-operate; to quote from Hodgetts, et al. again, the consultants seemed to have no feeling for the acute political sensitivity of their work. Nor did they have any sense of human relations in their dealings with the people they were organizing, or even of the need to communicate the meaning of what they were doing . . . . In the public service at large there was violent hostile reaction to these methods. The use of such alarming innovations as time and motion studies, and the suspicion that the introduction of more efficient automated methods would endanger the jobs of many employees, led to acute morale problems.[29] By 1921, reductions in the number of staff had taken place in a number of departments. In 1920, 2,288 persons were from the civil service, the majority being over sixty-five years of age.[30]

The most important overall criticism of the classification and reorganization was the failure to incorporate or even to attempt to elicit the views of the civil servants themselves. The failure to provide a voice for employees led the civil service organizations to press for democratic councils in the public service.[31] While the actual content of the council ideas advanced by the organizations differed, they were all based on the Whitley councils which were being introduced in Britain.

As L. W. C. S. Barnes indicated, the Whitley Council proposal was developed to counteract the movement for "the revolution of authority to the workshop and the establishment of workers' control therein . . . with the ultimate objective of assuring control of industry generally."[32] The main object of the Whitley Report was in essence to co-opt this movement and bring about … industrial with pride in their calling [who] care for its place as a contributer to the national well-being.[33]

In Britain the Whitley Council scheme was widely applied, although it never found favour with the mining and engineering unions which were well organized and militant and

rejected the scheme on a national basis.[34] When first applied to the British civil service, the councils were to have been only consultative. The government employees themselves demonstrated considerable militancy, maintained continuous pressure, and obtained executive power for the councils as well.[35]

In Canada, the idea of strict Whitley Councils was not strongly advocated by industrial employers.[36] As Bruce Scott indicated, the larger Canadian firms adopted the concept for progressive industrial relations which had been developed in the United States partly by Mackenzie King.[37] In the American type of council the representatives of the employees were elected directly to the council, thereby avoiding giving recognition to the unions,[38] and in fact, Mackenzie King hoped the councils would render trade unions unnecessary.[39] Although many international unions in Canada promoted the idea of labour management co-operation,[40] progressive businessmen in the United States had developed the ideology of co-operation early in this century.[41]

Given King's identification with the formation of employer- employee councils, and his public pronouncements that such councils would be set up in the Canadian civil service, it is ironic that he failed to carry through with his promise, This may have been at least partly caused by the pro-British orientation of the staff associations. The request for Whitley Councils included explicit recognition of the Associations from which representatives to the staff side would be chosen. This was contrary to the American model and would have acted to strengthen rather than weaken the employee associations.

The response of the inside service to the classification, the Board of hearing and the re-organization, can best be illustrated by contrasting the reaction of the C.S.A.O. and C.S.F. with that of the A.F.E.O.[42] The crucial distinction resided in the conception each organization had as to the mechanisms by which civil servants should have influence over official decision- making.

The classification, according to the A.F.E.O., had "resulted not only in the loss to the country of many efficient public servants, but also in most serious unrest"'.[43] The extent of discontent was by the number of changes which had to be made in the original classification, and the large number of individual appeals. The chief cause of the problem was the total lack of democratic consultation with the employees in the development of the scheme,[44] and the remedy proposed was the full adoption of Whitley Councils in the Canadian public service.

The A.F.E.O. advanced several arguments in favour of the Joint Council idea. In Britain the scheme had been advocated by the Federation of British Industries, an organization of employers in Britain.[45] In the councils of industrial democracy in the United States it was found that "the general tendency of the staff side was to elect as representatives, workmen who were fair-minded and unprejudiced."[46] In short the councils had been proven successful “as a means of promoting closer and more harmonious relations between the two

sides. They advance the interests of the employer on the one hand by increasing the efficiency of the workers and giving him the benefit of their ideas. On the other hand, they promote the well-being of the staff . . . ."[47]

The need for closer relations in the public service was declared by the A.F.E.O. to be self-evident. The problems of the service were similar to those of any large industry or service with thousands of employees and resulted from a "lack of that direct co-operation between employer and workers which becomes increasingly difficult in proportion to the size of the industry or service." This increase in size was the direct cause of the lack of understanding between employers and employees and: "Instead of co-operating for their mutual interest and welfare, they regard each other with a suspicion or distrust which operates against the best interests of both." Joint councils were required to overcome this problem of misunderstanding and "infuse the spirit of co-operation into the public service of Canada." Councils would have adjusted grievances and renewed the confidence of the employers in the civil servants, who would have imbued their work with a "new interest . . . new hope, and ambition."[48]

The A.F.E.O. placed the issue of democratization of the service above the demand for increased salaries. In their view, the Council's scope would be sufficiently broad to embrace all matters affecting the service, and its functions would include the provision of the best means for utilizing the ideas and experiences of the staff; means of securing to the staff a greater share and responsibility for the determination and observance of the conditions under which their duties are carried out; and determination of the general principles governing conditions of service, such as promotion, discipline, remuneration, etc.[49]

The fully devised scheme, which included an Interdepartmental Council, Department councils and District and Branch committees, nearly obviated the need for a Civil Service Commission. The A.F.E.O. concluded that the C.S.C. had failed as an administrative institution, but accepted the view that the Commission ought to be retained to oversee the merit principle. While the Councils were to work in harmony with the C.S.C., there were to be sharp lines of demarcation between the functions of the two institutions.[50] The A.F.E.O. supported the restoration to the Department Heads of powers which had been granted the C.S.C., with the proviso that such decentralization be accompanied by the establishment of Departmental councils.[51]

In its demand for the full Whitley formula, including executive powers, the A.F.E.O. was led to attack the C.S.C. By attacking the commission, the C.S.A.O. charged that the Federal Union sided objectively with the forces which were attempting to undermine the merit principle and restore patronage. The C.S.A.O. and C.S.F. adopted the policy of co-operating with the Civil Service Commission, which meant in practice that they advocated an advisory rather than executive function for the staff associations.

The C.S.A.O. felt that civil servants must do more than simply request reforms.

Rather, the civil servants should have been made "an actual and integral part of the machinery of reconstruction in the Service" and must "directly participate in the actual work of effecting these reforms. The service must itself supply the ideas and the initiative."[52]

Modern industrial relations, declared the C.S.A.O., could not prevent differences of opinion from arising. What was required was a mutually agreeable method of dispute resolution to maintain the feelings of mutual confidence. Civil servants regard their work as an essential: those major trade disputes which disrupt other industries do not occur in the civil service, and indeed, their occurrence would be wholly foreign to the nature of the service which public servants seek to give . . . . Civil servants are anxious to co-operate with the state, their employer, in this respect, and they lack only the machinery to fulfil their desires.[53] Justice demanded that civil servants be granted representation. The C.S.A.O. agreed that the form of the council would differ from that in private industry since "there is no opposition of interests between the two groups which would form the personnel of the Council in the civil service."[54]

The C.S.A.O. adopted the policy of support for the C.S.C. and the Board of Hearing, but vigorously protested the re-organization. In contrast with the "soulless machine" which the Griffenhagen scheme attempted to impose on the service, the C.S.A.O. requested the C.S.C. to conduct the re-organization. The Commission was to obtain "the best business, technical and professional advice available in the country", but civil servants were to be consulted and their representatives formed into an advisory committee.[55] MacInnes, of the C.S.A.O., proposed that in their efforts to get rid of Griffenhagen, "every moderate effort should be exhausted".[56]

The C.S.A.O./C.S.F. position identified the interests of the civil servants with the C.S.C., and placed all their energies into the preservation of that institution within which they hoped to have influence. The two employee representatives on the Board of Hearing came from the C.S.F., which gave them a stake in the maintenance of the Board, and connected their organizations concretely with any reforms that the Board made in the classification.

The C.S.A.O. declared that in the Board of Hearing "the principle of co-operation between employers and employees and a direct voice of the Service in its own affairs is on trial. The future development and extension of the democratic system is contingent upon the success of this experiment." According to the Association it was not only the civil servants' "own Board" but was an actual Whitley Council, a continually sitting board of arbitration.[57] To counteract the criticisms of the A.F.E.O., which had charged the Board with bias and with being unrepresentative of the service in letters to the press and to meighen,[58] the C.S.A.O. and C.S.F. drafted a joint reply. In this joint response, which was sent to the press and to government members in February, 1921, the two organizations disassociated themselves from the "ill- advised attacks" which came from an "insignificant minority" of civil servants,

and assured the public that their policy "has ever been to work in harmony, not only with the Civil Servants whom they represent, but with the Departments and the Government whom they serve."[59]

By referring to the Board of Hearing as a functioning Whitley Council, the two associations indicated the minor scale of the goals which they sought. It was a considerable narrower conception of a Whitley Council than that held by the Federal Union and reflected the looseness with which the two staff associations utilized terminology. For example the Civil Service Association claimed that the Service had actually attained the principle of collective bargaining -- which labour unions were still having to struggle for -- when the Minister of Finance in 1918 "consulted with the committee from the Federation and the Association regarding the Civil Service Act of 1918 and the Bonus."[60] Having perhaps been on the outside writing memorials it may have been perceived as a monumental advance when first able to present a case in person. Nevertheless, this was still a long way from collective bargaining.

United within an overall conception of the necessity for employer-employee co-operation, the two responses reflected different conceptions of industrial democracy. The A.F.E.O. demanded a 'workers' council' which, by including more of an executive function for the councils, approximated the more radical demands made in the private sector for workers' control. The C.S.F./C.S.A.O. response was based on an identification of the best interests of the service with the continuation of the C.S.C., and as a consequence they sought a consultative role within that institution. They wanted an advisory body in which the executive of the Federation and Association would participate as equals with the government representatives on a National Council. This 'centralization' of employee representation in the hands of a clique in Ottawa was thrown into relief by the Amalgamated Civil Servants of Canada. Consistent with their more democratic and decentralized structure, the Amalgamated Civil Servants was more concerned with local appeal and rating boards than with the idea of a National Council. To the C.S.F., however, this merely demonstrated "the parochial character of [t]his organization".[61]

The actual situation in the 1920s was not that the government simply refused to accept the more radical proposals of the Federal Union; despite accepting verbally the desirability of Joint Councils, the government stalled consistently in implementing them. When asked to explain their refusal to act, government representatives placed the blame on the disunity of the service. The basic disunity was between the C.S.F. and the AC.S.C. which were rival organizations. It may have been expected that the government's refusal would promote efforts at unity; in practice it simply increased disunity as both organizations placed the blame on the other for being unreasonable and advancing the least workable alternative for unity. It may be suggested that this was not a 'serious' objection on the part of the government but operated rather as a convenient excuse for refusing to grant more influence

to the staff associations than necessary. Certainly the disunited service was able to obtain other concessions from the government, in particular that of superannuation. The government found that, for example, in the Board of hearing it was able to offer token representation, as indications of its sincerity, which helped to promote the in- fighting.

One of the major causes of the discontent was the complexity of the classification as originally brought down. In the British civil service there were only four broadly defined clerical classes which were differentiated on the basis of responsibility rather than duty. While direct recruitment to any of the classes, was possible opportunity was provided for promotion between classes.[62] In the United States the acceptance of the ideology of scientific management meant that, in contrast to Britain, much more attention was paid to the details of classification. The characteristic American plan encompassed a much larger number of gradations, each of which was differentiated on the basis of "a narrow range of carefully defined duties."[63] The contract to classify the Canadian service given to the Arthur Young Company meant that the American system would be adopted by the Canadian government.

Once established, the rigid classification system created a hierarchy of positions with an annual salary readjustment which would induce feelings of accomplishment and individual achievement. The civil servants were given a graduated series of promotions which were meant to dispel the notion that promotion was a 'millennial prospect'. The establishment of objective criteria, examinations and the merit system meant that civil servants were competing for positions with other potential aspirants. While, in a hierarchical structure, advancement over time was the norm, the minute job gradations created a myriad of invidious distinctions which divided workers form each other and individualized their career patterns. It is important to remember, however, that the conditions which gave rise to the need for a classification -- the growing size of the public service, its expanding economic role, and the concentration of employees -- exerted pressure in the opposite direction. Both developments occurred simultaneously and exerted pressures that were in contradiction to each other. Other objective circumstances would determine the weight of each in the actual development of employee consciousness.

III Postal Workers Respond to Reorganization

The application of the principles of classification to the Post Office Department occasioned numerous appeals to the Board of Hearing. According to the Postal Clerks' Association, the plan put forward by the 'experts' envisaged minute specialization in post office work, but the nature of the work involved frequent temporary changes from one area to another. With this in mind they recommended that the lines of demarcation be less rigid in distinguishing classes, and be adapted so as to encourage more flexibility so that employees would have a general knowledge of all phases of the work.[64]

The Association also registered complaints about the limited actual opportunities for promotion. Claiming that even the Arthur Young Company had admitted that ninety percent of postal clerks would never reach a higher grade than city sorter, the D.P.C.A. requested a significantly higher maximum salary for this class.[65] The postal clerks were particularly incenses that the salary maximum was set at $1,380, which was less than some were in fact making, and protest letters from numerous branches poured into the Post Office Department. Much of the agitation was caused by the disruption of the traditional differentials between 'classes' of postal employees: postal clerks demanded to be paid a salary equivalent to the railway mail clerks; postal porters declared their work to be more arduous than that of the letter carriers; representations were made to wipe out the east/west discrimination in salaries. The experts were declared to have laid down "illogical, unworkable and undesirable lines of promotion", and their competency to re-organize the post-office was seriously questioned.[66]

The protest of civil servants did not only proceed through their representatives: in Brantford two postal clerks resigned in view of the classification. This prompted the Chamber of Commerce to write to the Postmaster General, claiming that the classification was unjust and detrimental to postal efficiency, as proved by the resignation of "two of the most efficient members of the staff."[67]

The agitation in the post office department, while serious, never developed into an actual strike, although early in 1920 both the letter carriers and the postal clerks were on the brink of such an action. In late summer, 1919, the postal employees in Windsor, Ontario, protested against the reduction in pay suffered by the postal clerks and the pay boost received by "postmasters, assistant postmasters, inspectors and superintendents'. At that time the postal workers had decided against a strike "until their union headquarters announced something definite in respect to the protest being made by civil service employees all over the dominion against the reclassification bill."[68] The same postal workers met again in November to voice their grievances, and President Cantwell of the D.P.C.A. addressed them in the hope that drastic action could be avoided.[69] J. W. Green, the Secretary of the Postal Clerks' Association, threatened the possibility of a strike in November.[70] In the Maritimes the Rural Mail Carriers threatened to strike in November or December, an action which was postponed when the acting Prime Minister promised to consider their grievances carefully.[71]

Late in 1919 the letter carriers in Toronto took a strike vote which passed unanimously. At that meeting, however, it was decided to postpone taking any action until the new year. The Toronto branch of the F.A.L.C. sent letters to thirty-one other branches requesting support. Quebec City, London and Hamilton were reported to have replied first, and were in favour of a strike. It was reported that a strike vote of the entire membership would be forthcoming.[72] The Toronto branch, however, decided to wait upon the

government rather than strike as previously voted. In the spring it was announced that letter carriers would in fact receive increases in pay.[73]

The postal workers manifested a great deal of local militancy and unlike other civil servants contemplated strike action, and passed resolutions in favour of withdrawing their services in protest. It would appear that the executive of the associations played a moderating role, which was based on the necessity to have a co-ordinated strike. The east/west split in organizations hampered action and made a Dominion-wide strike very unlikely. In addition, as the Canadian Labour Press pointed out, it would have been difficult "to carry a strike vote in . . . towns or cities where the staff would be probably ten or twenty men and working conditions of an entirely different character."[74] At any rate, in the east the Toronto post office was the recognized leader, and its decision to accept the 'normal' channels of dispute resolution carried great weight. The associations and individual workers were also being heard by the Board of hearing and some readjustments were made in the relative salaries of the various 'classes', which undercut some of the militancy.

That this did not end disgruntlement in the post office is clear. Exercising his duty to bring to the attention of the Government "any anticipated calamity of national import", commissioner Jameson wrote to Prime Minister Borden in June, 1920, informing him of his "profound conviction that a very general suspension of work in the Postal Service will take place within the next few weeks." Describing such a strike as a disastrous "disturbance of the public and commercial affairs" of the nation, Jameson concluded that: "The immediate cause of the strike will be the employment to re-classify the Post Office department, of Messrs. Griffenhagen and Associates in the personnel and methods of whom the Service has lost confidence."[75] while the letter was motivated to some extent by the desire to disassociate the C.S.C. from the re-organization, the declaration was an indication that opposition and militancy in the civil service were strongest in the post office department. The strength of this reaction was linked to its recent history which in turn was related to the proletarian features of the class position of postal workers which was of successful militancy, only marginally, if at all, 'white-collar'.

One of the most drastic re-organizations which took place under the auspices of the C.S.C. occurred in the Printing Bureau. This intervention affected other non-'white-collar' government employees who were members of non-civil service trade unions, and provinces an interesting comparison point with which to judge the effects of government employment.

IV The Printing Bureau and Ottawa Typographical Union (O.T.U.)

Under the Civil Service Act of 1918, the power of appointment was taken away from both the Minister and the Printing Bureau Officials -- the King's Printer and the Superintendent of Printing -- and vested instead with the Civil Service Commission. The

C.S.C. was not given the power to set wage and salary rates in the Bureau; these were established by the Cabinet and were based on the rates prevailing in Montreal and Toronto.[76] Despite its new responsibility, the C.S.C. did not undertake the re-organization of the Bureau until it was called to do so early in 1919.

The man directly responsible for the investigation was Martin Burrell, who, in being appointed Secretary of State, was the Minister responsible for the Bureau. Within a few weeks of his appointment his "keen business instinct" led him to seek an Order-in-Council calling on the C.S.C. to investigate the bureau.[77] The first investigation of the Bureau was conducted very much from the top down and in secret, and a list of the "first ninety" employees to be laid off was drawn up by the C.S.C. and made known through the medium of the public press. This method was quite stunning, and serious discontent was voiced by the Bureau employees over the procedures employed, and the effects of throwing devoted public servants out of work.[78] Commissioner Jameson, who had first been instructed to reorganize the bureau subsequently appointed a committee of three to investigate conditions and submit a report.[79]

The committee was composed of Adam Lewis, of Southam Press, Eugene Tarte, of La Patrie Publishing Company, and E. F. Slack, of the Gazette Publishing Company -- all three were representatives of commercial printing establishments in Montreal.[80] These experts were neither foreigners, nor were they ignorant of the details of the work they were investigating. If the main objection to their report had a different origin from those raised against the Arthur Young Company, nevertheless the criticisms of both were similar in many respects. The Committee held all its sessions in camera, took no evidence from the employees, and gave the employees no opportunity to respond.[81] The Report was written in secret, handed to the C.S.C., tabled in the House on March 6, and immediately reviewed by a Cabinet Sub- committee.[82]

Wage negotiations between the Pressmen's' Union in the Bureau and the government had begun in September, 1918, and reached a climax in March 1919. Amidst rumours that the report heavily scored inefficiency and over-manning at the Bureau, the negotiations were broken off early in March, just before the Report was made public.[83] During the evening of March 5 a mass meeting of the employees of the bureau was held, and addressed by L. D. Burling and Frank Grierson, Secretary and President of the C.S.F. respectively, and Tom Moore of the T.L.C. Within an atmosphere charged with memories of previous lay offs and threats of future ones, the 'hand-picked' committee came in for substantial abuse from all speakers.[84] At the termination of the meeting the Pressmen and their assistants took a strike vote which passed unanimously. The strike began on Friday, March 7, and involved about one hundred pressmen and assistants.[85] This represented less than ten percent of the Bureau's 1200 employees. While the Ottawa Typographical Union No. 102 resolved to extend financial assistance, the question of a sympathy strike was not immediately raise,

although rumours persisted that unless the pressmen's' demands were granted the hand and machine compositors would join them.[86]

The charges that the Printing Bureau was inefficient were by no means new. Claims had been made as early as the mid-1890s that printers were not hired or fired at the Bureau on the basis of their skills or efficiency, but rather according to their standing in the patronage system.[87] At that time the allegations had been immediately challenged by the Bureau printers who resented the implication that they were not as good at their work as printers in private establishments.[88]

One of the most important grievances of the Bureau employees at that tie had been the policy of laying off large numbers of printers whenever there was a decline in government printing requests. As a consequence the Bureau employees asked to be brought within the Civil Service and their positions made permanent.[89] Periodic lay offs continued until 1911, at which time, in the works of the 1919 Committee's Report, instead of asking the employees "to help the plant out in this way", the staff was granted permanency of position and two weeks paid holiday a year, "for no particular reason other than the one that they wanted it and could get it",[90] an admission suggesting that trade union struggle in the past had played a role in establishing permanent employment.

The Final Report of the special Committee appointed by the C.S.C. compared the Bureau with prevailing commercial practices and claimed that the Printing Bureau was inefficient, extravagant, wasteful, and seriously over-manned. In the language of scientific management, the committee claimed that the 'system' had "placed each employee upon the dead level, and made it uncomfortable for anyone to attempt to distinguish himself amongst his fellows."[91] The Report made five general recommendations to improve the efficient running of the Bureau: some staff members were to be eliminated with only the most efficient workers remaining; adequate records of each man's work were to be kept; the piece rate system was to be adopted; management was to be re- organized; and the Bureau placed on an independent, business basis.

The Committee charged the management with not holding business-like attitudes. As an example, the Report quoted a memorandum submitted by the Superintendent of Printing to the King's Printer in which the need to increase the amount of work to equalize the staff was raised. This suggestion was clearly contrary to the practice of private companies in which the principle of reducing the staff to the level of work held favour. Since the Bureau Editorial board had reduced the amount of Government literature printed without dismissing workers, "the art of doing nothing and making it appear like real labour has been highly developed." Accordingly the report recommended that the staff be reduced to balance the amount of work, with orders above this amount being placed with private companies. To achieve the goal of retaining only the most efficient workers, the Committee declared that all employees over sixty ought to be retired with an adequate pension, and other workers

laid off to find employment elsewhere.[92]

The lack of proper records to show the exact length of time each man had been kept busy was criticized, and it was suggested that the piece-rate system be adopted. The retention of efficient employees only, coupled with the piece rate system, would provide great motivation for the workers, and an incentive for efficiency and higher output which was lacking when the employees were all on a 'dead level'.[93] At its March 5 meeting, Tom Moore had served notice the employees would not accept the establishment of the piece rate system, a principle which had been militantly resisted in the past.[94]

While it absolved the executive officers from any responsibility for the problems, the Report recommended the re- organization of the 'executive force' of the Bureau. Particular importance was given to the role of the foreman and sub-foremen who had allegedly neither assumed their proper responsibilities nor been given proper backing. Only the most efficient foremen were to be retained, one of those to be designated the chief foreman. The management was to exercise full powers of hiring and firing. This provision was in direct contradiction to the ITU tradition of shop-floor control. The foreman was a union man and was subject to union discipline.[95] All supervisory staff including the sub-foremen were to receive increases in salary. Operated solely under the control of its independent management, the Bureau was to "be administered upon an independent commercial basis" and a business 'cost system' would be introduced.[96]

The daily press in Ottawa declared themselves to be in sympathy with the Report on the Printing Bureau, which was described as "an Augean stable of graft, incompetence and corruption".[97] Rather than finding the Report 'shocking', the Journal Press declared that it simply substantiated what had "been a standing joke to all those who knew anything about the operation of an efficient printing establishment".[98]

The Ottawa Typographical Union (O.T.U.), which had in the past made reform proposals to the government, formed a special committee of its own to review the report. A response was published one week later, on March 14, which referred to the C.S.C. document as "slanderous and a gross libel".[99] The response rebutted the specific charges that were made and placed the blame for conditions on the government. For example, while the response admitted that employees were at times idle, it was claimed that this was caused by another form of political patronage by which the government handed a great deal of work out to private companies.[100]

More importantly, besides refuting the specific details of the cases in the report, the O.T.U. attacked the implicit capitalistic nature of the proposed re-organization. The leniency towards the management was specifically repudiated,[101] as was the assertion of the report that the office staff was not only fairly efficient but even somewhat underpaid.[102] On the contrary, the response of the O.T.U. claimed that the last time a Minister had investigated the Bureau "the aftermath . . . was that the printing bureau pay list was loaded

up with a clerical staff of cost finders and 'cost losers', with fair salaries and comparatively easy duties, all of whom have to be charged to the product of the operators."[103] Turning the tables on the investigators, the O.T.U. charged that the "official class which is being carried on the back of the producing class is too heavy and would never exist in a commercial office.[104] There is an implicit 'producer ideology' being expressed which separates the workforce into 'working ' and 'surplus' class segments.

While the capitalistic nature of the proposed re- organization was only implicit in the O.T.U. response, the major criticism was based explicitly on the 'capitalistic' nature of the investigating committee. It was formed of those who were "solely representing interested capitalists, controlled directly and paid by their employers to induce the government to deliver the bureau into their hands at their own valuation".[105] In was in the objective interests of the Commission to condemn government inefficiency, have the bureau closed, and thereby pick up themselves the business of parliament. The Quebec Chronicle drew the logical conclusion from the C.S.C. report and claimed it was less against the government and the patronage system; the real lesson to be learned was a warning against public ownership. Nearly every department of government, the Chronicle concluded, would be managed more efficiently by private enterprise, and the Bureau ought to be forced to stand on its own feet.[106] One of the main planks of the platform of both the T.L.C. and the International Typographical Union was the desirability of government ownership of public utilities, and the O.T.U. Response indicated that nothing short of the "continuation of the Bureau as a national enterprise would be satisfactory".[107]

Unlike the debates which surrounded the postal strike and the union campaign within the C.S.F., no explicit mention was made of the importance of the service rendered the public by the bureau employees. This suggests that to some extent the 'service ethic' may apply less to government owned enterprises, and the traditional working class employed by the government. There is also a distinction between direct 'service' to the public, however, was common to most government departments at Ottawa as the clerical staff became routinized functionaries and dealt with the public through the medium of pieces of paper.

There was an important parallel in the response of the civil servants to the classification and the response of the O.T.U. to the report. The attacks on the classification endangered the power and even the existence of the Civil Service Commission, and many civil servants defended the institution and sought to co-operate with the Commissioners. This conservative response limited the civil servants to modifying details in the classification, but accepting its content and method in principle. In the case of the Printing Bureau the threat to government ownership induced a more conservative response on the part of the printers.

The response of the O.T.U. to the attempt by the government to impose scientific management and reorganization must be seen against the experience of the printing unions

as a whole. Unlike civil servants, the employees of the printing bureau belonged to unions in which the majority of employees worked for private concerns. To the extent that wider union issues has a causal effect on the response of Bureau employees, the conservatism may have been reversed. An employers group, the United Tupothetae, had initiated a general onslaught against the ITU which led to open shop drives and precipitated a strike wave, the most significant of which occurred in Toronto.[108] Printers in general reacted militantly to the employer onslaught -- but in 1919 the printing bureau employees capitulated. Besides the conservative implications of government ownership -- in the sense that the loss of this principle was important and could be avoided by engaging in only moderate activity -- the early attacks on the ITU may have produced, at first, a policy of defensiveness.

During the furore surrounding the Committee Report, the Pressmen had continued their strike. It was in relation to the conservative influence produced by the attacks on government ownership that the Pressmen's strike was settled. The Montreal Star had predicted that the Report "would have exercised a quieting effect upon the agitation".[109] At a meeting of the Allied Printing Trades in Ottawa the conclusion was reached that the continuation of the strike would force the closure of the Bureau. The other unions had continued to work and decided against striking alongside the Pressmen, but the work could not be continued without the full staff. Closing the Bureau would mean that government work would be given out to private companies and the principle of government ownership would receive a severe setback. Consequently the Pressmen 'sacrificed' their own immediate interests for the employees as a whole and the principle of government ownership and returned to work on March 21. The only concession they obtained from the government was the continuation of the two dollar bonus which was to have terminated on April 1 for an additional two months. On June 1, 1919, the printers in Montreal and Toronto were expected to negotiate a new agreement which would be reflected in the wages paid at the printing bureau.[110]

All government employee organizations were committed to the elimination of political patronage, and in the case of the Printing Bureau, the ideas of re-organization and increased efficiency did not arise simply from the outside but were raised by the unions themselves.[111] The distinction between the concept of reform as practices by businesses and adopted by government, and as desired by the union, rested on the question of employee output. In the conclusion to their Response the O.T.U. stated that "we will not be satisfied with any other solution . . . that does not contemplate the adoption of the principle of the operatives having representations through a committee or council on the Board of Management, whereby the operatives will be in a position of relative responsibility for its efficient and economical operation as a principle of government ownership."[112] As in the civil service as a whole, such councils were slow to develop, and in the context in which they were requested they would simply have provided, in the words of the Journal Press, "a

demonstration of that close association between capital and labour now likely advocated."[113]

Having abandoned the strike route and acquiesced to the government re-organization, the O.T.U. attempted to obtain pension rights for its members as lay offs continued sporadically. The union was opposed to simple gratuities in lieu of pensions, and proposed that an adequate allowance be granted to those employees who were defined as superfluous.[114] Objections to the re- organization were confined to official representations, and in early November the government announced that an additional 250 employees were to be laid off. Concurrent with this, however, the government also announced that a pension settlement had been reached. The settlement, described by the Canadian Labour Press as of "a very generous character", provided that those over 45 with sufficiently long service would receive an allowance on a sliding scale, amounting to one-third of their salary for those between 55 and 65. Those under 45 would receive a gratuity of two months salary.[115] According to the C.S.C. the total staff reduction would reach about four hundred, and lay offs were still being reported in June, 1920.[116] According to Federal Union No. 66, the 'reorganization', for which they claimed Griffenhagen was responsible, had effected saving , but at a distinct loss of efficiency. Work done in the bureau was "less satisfactory,. . . put through more slowly . . . and accompanied by more frequent mistakes of a serious nature than ever occurred before."[117]

One of the interesting aspects that emerges from the events surrounding the strike and the re-organization was the demonstration of the more favourable conditions of work which government employees possessed, and the negative effects of the efforts at rationalization on some of these. While the mechanical staff was ordered to use the 'back door' when entering the Bureau, and would "incur grave suspension for using a front door used by others who report to work an hour later",[118] the possession of an inferior social status was not unique to mechanical trades workers in government employment. Wages were above or on a par with private shops, and the employees of the Bureau received a total of 29 paid holidays during the year.[119] The Journal Press agreed that public employees had the right to expect "more sympathetic treatment than they would probably receive in some of the printing houses with which the Bureau is compared. The Government, for instance, cannot afford to throw its employees out on the street every time there is a slackness of work, or when they become too old to labour at the top notch of efficiency."[120]

This argument is ironic because it was the permanency of employment -- one of the major benefits of public service -- which was being seriously eroded. The establishment of business practices and commercial norms made both the work and market situations of government employees more similar to those of private employment.

V Rationalization and the Professional Institute

The efforts at rationalizing the public service affected employees in all class positions. As the government expanded its social and economic role increasing numbers of scientific

and technical workers were recruited into public employment, and in 1911 they were placed in a distinct category within the public service.[121] The expansion of the economy was accompanied by an increased need for scientific personnel in private employment, and salaries increased rapidly in that sector. The result was that the status of the scientific and technical workers in public employment suffered, relatively and their demand for higher salaries was matched by the number of desertions of the service for more lucrative employment elsewhere. For example, the technical employees engaged in experimental work for the Department of Agriculture had written twenty memoranda to the government between 1918 and 1920 protesting the inadequate salaries which were forcing many professional workers to leave the service.[122]

The individualized nature of the work performed by professionals made the task of classifying these positions extremely difficult. In the British civil service, the Departments were given a certain amount of autonomy to reclassify positions if necessary, and this option was most commonly used by scientific and technical workers.[123] It was not only dissatisfaction with the salaries, ten, which brought about the numerous appeals against the classification brought by professional and technical workers to the Board of Hearing. The effect of the rationalization of the departments was to bring about a consciousness that employees could resist successfully only if they were organized. It was as a direct result of the classification that the professional and scientific workers organized a staff association, and in February, 1920, the Professional Institute of the Civil Service of Canada was formed.[124]

The choice of 'institute' rather than 'association' paralleled the practice in Britain. In other ways, however, it reflected the perceptions of the professional workers that the concept of an 'association' was too closely linked to that of a 'trade union'. The Institute refused to affiliate with the Civil Service Federation on the grounds that its activities too closely resembled those of unions. Nevertheless, much of its own activities on behalf of the higher paid civil servants were similar to those conducted by the C.S.F.[125] As for other professional associations, education and conduct were important goals, but since the Institute included in its membership numerous disciplines, the effort at education concentrated on the 'service ethic' implied by government employment.

The Professional Institute, took the position that the classification of the scientific sector was too complex and recommended that all scientific and professional positions be organized into a single class with six salary grades.[126] As was the case for other groups of employees who appealed to the Board of Hearing, the result often complicated the classification more; individual professional workers made appeals to the Board of Hearing out of proportion to their numbers.[127] The result, according to the Civil Service News, was that scientific and technical personnel had their positions strengthened. Nevertheless, the classification continued to distinguish between numerous classes, salaries were still relatively low, and professional workers remained dissatisfied. Throughout the 1920s the

government had difficulty retaining its university-trained employees.[128]

More than other categories of civil servants, the professionals perceived themselves to be members of a middle 'salaried class'. Despite a verbal identification with other salaried workers, the Institute wanted a Civil Service Council of its own,[129] and, as we have seen, refused to affiliate with the C.S.F., even though the majority of the federation's members were clerical workers. Their perception of their superior position, even within the salaried 'class' as a whole, was clearly expressed in a letter addressed to Prime Minister Meighen by the technical employees of the Department of Agriculture. The letter was a protest against the "grave injustice" which had been done to university-trained men who attended college in order to "contribute more to the ideals of civilization" and to provide themselves remuneration above that obtained from a high school education. The letter claimed that the government had handled the numerous appeals in an unbusinesslike and discourteous way: "No little side-street merchant would deal with any of his employees or customers with such scant consideration . . . . An appeal like this, made by men of our standing, implies that we are gravely concerned and indeed earnest. Efficiency and loyalty are put under grave stress when we are dealt with in this way and expected to suffer it all in silence . . . .

". . . [I]n occupying the place of 'first citizen' of this Dominion you [Meighen] should be more than ready to do something for that class in the community which constitutes really the backbone of our civilization because among that class are men which you must admit are your colleagues insofar as ideals and training are concerned . . . . The late Borden ministry made itself almost loathsome to the salaried class as a whole, which includes these men, for the reason that it allowed them to be crushed between the upper and neither millstones of capital and labour . . . .

The salaried class as a whole, along with some skilled workers, were primarily responsible for maintaining civilization, morals and religion, and adequate salaries were declared crucial for promoting business expansion.[130]

By distinguishing themselves from capital and labour, the professionals placed the salaried workers as a whole in the position of an intermediate class. In their own perceptions they identified more closely with the higher officials than with the lower status clerical workers. While professional civil servants claimed salaries which were higher than the average for government employment, the classification of the 1920s undermined somewhat their independent status, and their market situations dropped drastically in relation to private employment -- their most common comparison point.

As defections from the service continued, the C.S.C. recommended higher salaries for the technical, scientific and administrative workers. These new scales were in fact less than parliament was willing to pay. Consequently in 1929 the Royal Commission on Technical and Professional Services was established. The proposals of this Report, which have scientific and technical workers a greater increase, were not implemented, however, because

of the onset of the Great Depression.[131]

VI Conclusion: Responses to Rationalization

The period of greatest crisis occurred during the establishment of new norms and the breaking of old traditions. Once rationalized, new norms were developed, new patterns formed, and barring further change, new traditions became routinized. A process of relative proletarianization occurring inter- generationally would produce minimal response, although it might have profound long-run importance. The period between 1918 and 1921 witnessed a conglomeration of forces which together depressed rapidly the objective situation of federal employees.

In those critical years, the 'salaried class' in the public service experienced some elements of a proletarianization of their class position. The war-induced inflation narrowed the gap between government salaries and wages obtained in the private sector. The need for greater regulation over the economy brought about an expansion of government employment, concentrating larger numbers of civil servants together. The reorganization of work undermined to some extent the permanency of employment which had been an important benefit of civil service employment.

The concrete response to these objective changes in the work and market situations varied between different groups of civil servants. In the Printing Bureau and the Post Office, two departments which had directly, experienced reorganization the probability of strike action was quite high. The C.S.A.O. and the C.S.F., which represented mostly salaried clerical workers, compromised with the classification and became for a time an integral part of the machinery of the C.S.C. through the Board of Hearing. The professional and technical workers, while maintaining a perception of themselves as having a superior status, reacted to the classification by forming an association which represented its members to the government. These higher paid civil servants refused to affiliate with the C.S.F. and its more average salaried employees.

The different responses would seem to vary along class lines, with the 'unionateness' being highest for the F.A.L.C. and the D.P.C.A., and lowest for the Professional Institute. The exception to this generalization was the A.F.E.O. which was clearly more 'unionate' in character than the C.S.A.O., but nevertheless attempted to organize the same body of salaried clerical workers. Since the 'inside' service compromised a large number of distinct class positions -- from prevailing rate employees such as carpenters to technical and professional workers -- it would be reasonable to predict that those employees in Ottawa who were most Proletarian- like in their class position would be attracted to the A.F.E.O. as opposed to the C.S.A.O.

We have seen that the departments which voted in favour of affiliation with the T.L.C. generally had more contact with workers then with Ottawa officials; this, however, would affect their objective class position less than their conscious identification. The A.F.E.O. did

express a great deal of concern for prevailing rate employees, and did advance the demand for an adequate minimum salary as a key aspect of their platform. In this way they were similar to the AC.S.C. which was comprised mostly of western postal workers and the lower paid clericals.[132] When the Associated Federal Employees of Canada was chartered in 1922, Federal Union No. 66 remained in affiliation, and was joined by Union No. 67, the Ottawa Office Cleaners, a local formed primarily by char women who cleaned government buildings. When the A.F.E.O. surrendered its charter in 1924, the Office Cleaners continued to exist as a union, receiving a charter directly from the T.L.C. The third local to join the AFEC, No. 68, was formed by employees at the Lachine Canal. This indicates that workers with more proletarian-like work situations were attracted to the A.F.E.O. We do not have available the membership list complete with classification information with which to test the hypothesis that the lower ratings and temporary employees tended to join the A.F.E.O. in preference to the C.S.A.O., which would have given the union more of a proletarian membership to accompany its higher degree of 'unionateness'.

The tendency to seek simple correlations, such as between class and union character, must be seen as generalizations which may or may not apply in concrete cases.[133] The objective changes in the work situation of clerical workers at the end of the first world war placed them in an increasingly ambiguous position. The attempt to unionize civil servants was one response to these changing conditions, which accounts for it arising at that specific time. The incompleteness of the changes and their uneven development caused an incomplete and uneven response.

In certain ways the response of civil servants to the rationalization of the service paralleled the 'new unionism' which had occurred among skilled workers. While the concepts of industrial democracy' and 'employer-employee co-operation' may have arisen during the progressive era in business circles in the United States, their implementation was not brought about simply by employer benevolence. In both The U.S. and Britain rank and file rebellion against the introduction of scientific management was leading to radical calls for 'workers' control' of industry. It was to co-opt this movement that the employers responded with schemes of employee representation and worker-management councils. The employers were thereby able to divert a workers' movement that had progressive potential into conservative channels.

The demands by the Canadian civil servants did not possess such radical possibilities. The classification and reorganization of the service led to employee demands for a voice in decision making, but only a minority of the Ottawa service demanded a joint council scheme in which executive power would reside in the hands of the Council. While this was consistent with the general phenomenon in the private sector, the content of the demands for an advisory council reflected the 'middle class' status of the salaried clerical workers as well as their conception of the legitimate legislative function of the government.

4 Response to Classification & Reorganization

Ironically, at the same time that census statistics show a great leap in the proportion of the work force engaged in clerical occupations, the nature of clerical work was beginning to undergo some significant modifications. If more workers could claim a status as 'salaried employees' and hence part of a 'new middle class', elements of this 'new class' was already beginning to identify with the working class. This development in the civil service was short-lived. The crisis passed and with it the new militancy of the civil servant. If organizations continued to expand, the character of their activity became more conservative, and they promoted a 'middle class ethic' which was no longer significantly challenged.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE

[1] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution. See especially Chapter 4, "Classification, Reorganization, and Reaction, 1918- 1921."
[2] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 46.
[3] "Proposed Report of the Economic and Development Commission", Borden Papers, Vol. 81. According to William Foran the secretary of the C.S.C., the crisis of WWI "brought into sharp relief the urgency fro national efficiency, for drastic reform, and for a thorough reorganization of resources and capabilities . . . ; civil service reform was considered . . . second only to the winning of the war." Civil Service Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May 1928), p. 25.
[4] The Civilian (Special Edition, 1916), p. 133.
[5] Civil Service News, Vol. 1, No. 16 (17 January 1921), p. 7.
[6] Ibid.
[7] The Civilian, Vol. X, No. 18 (21 December 1917), p. 383.
[8] "Report" of a Committee of the Privy Council, 12 July 1917, Borden Papers, Vol. 82.
[9] Department of Militia and Defence to Borden, 15 July 1917, Borden Papers, Vol. 82.
[10] The Civilian, Vol. X, No. 23 (1 May 1918), pp. 482-483.
[11] Ibid., Vol. XI, No. 1 (10 May 1918), p. 30.
[12] Canadian Labour Press, 13 November 1920.
[13] J. E. Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 59.
[14] Dawson, The Civil Service of Canada p. 95.
[15] The Civilian, Vol. XI, No. 9 (16 August 1918).
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., Vol. X, No. 20 (18 January 1918), p. 422.
[18] The Postal Journal, 21 June 1918, in The Civilian, Vol. XI, No. 5, p. 109.
[19] Civil Service News, Vol. 1, No. 2 (21 August 1920).
[20] The Civilian, Vol. XI, No. 1 (26 April 1918), p. 22.
[21] J. L. Payne, "The Civil Servant" quoted in J. E. Hodgetts, Biography, p. 33.

[22] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, pp. 68-69.

[23] Ibid., p. 70.

[24] Dawson, The Civil Service of Canada, quoted in Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[25] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 68; Patterson to Meighen, 15 December 1920, Meighen Papers, Vol. 18.

[26] Patterson to Meighen, 15 December 1920, Meighen Papers, Vol. 18; Board of Hearing to Patterson, n.d., Ibid.; J. E. Hodgetts, Biography, pp. 73-74.

[27] J. E. Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution m o, 71.

[28] Memorandum, G. D. Robertson to Buskard, 7 October 1921, Meighen Papers, Vol. 19, quoted in Ibid., p. 81.

[29] J. E. Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 71.

[30] Civil Service Review Vol. XI, No. 12 (December 1933), p. 44.

[31] T.L.C., Proceedings, 1920, p. 74.

[32] Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations Handbook (London: HMSO, 1961) quoted in L. W. C. S. Barnes, Consult and Advise: A History of the National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada 1944-1974 (Kingston: Queen's University Industrial Relations Center, 1975), p. 7.

[33] Barnes, Consult and Advise, p. 9.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid., p. 15.

[37] Bruce Scott, "'A Place in the Sun': The Industrial Council at Massey-Harris, 1919-1929", Labour/Le Travailleur (1976), pp. 159-160.

[38] Ibid., p. 160.

[39] F. A. McGregor, The Fall and Rise of Mackenzie King (Toronto: 1962), p. 252, quoted in Ibid., p. 160.

[40] See issues of the Canadian Labour Press, 1919-1920.

[41] Scott, "'A Place in the sun'", p. 158.

[42] The main distinctions between the two organizations is well presented in Hodgetts, Biography, pp. 166-171.

[43] The Civilian, Vol. XIII, No. 11 (October 1920), p. 423.

[44] A.F.E.O. "Resolution Re Classification of the Federal Civil Service", Meighen Papers, Vol. 18.

[45] Patterson to Meighen, 9 March 1921, Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] A.F.E.O. Bulletin No. 1, 5 August 1920.

[50] Patterson to Meighen, 9 March 1921, Meighen Papers, Vol. 18.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Civil Service News, Vol. 1, No. 16 (17 January 1921), p. 1.

[53] Ibid., Vol. 5, No. 4 (March 1927), p. 9.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., Vol. 1 No. 17 (1 January 1921), pp. 1-2.

[56] Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 2 (21 August 1920), p. 5.

[57] Ibid., p.3.

[58] Ibid., Vol. 1, No. 16 (17 January 1921), p. 3.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid., Vol. 1 No. 2, (21 August 1920), p. 3.

[61] Civil Service Review, Vol. 2, No. 6 (June 1929), p. 25.

[62] Leonard D. White, "The British Civil Service" in Leonard D. White, et al., Civil Service Abroad: Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1935), p. 14.

[63] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[64] D.P.C.A. to Coulter, Post office Department, Miscellaneous Records (26 June, 1919), Vol. 103.

[65] D.P.C.A. Memorandum, 4 July 1919, Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Brantford Chamber of Commerce to Blondin, 27 February 1920, Ibid.

[68] Canadian Labour Press, 5 July 1919.

[69] Ibid., 22 November 1919.

[70] Ibid., 15 November 1919.

[71] Ibid., 22 November 1919.

[72] Ibid., 24 January 1920.

[73] Ibid., 24 April 1920.

[74] Ibid., 27 December 1919.

[75] Jameson to Borden, 30 June 1920, Borden Papers, Vol. 14.

[76] "Wages and Hours in the Printing Bureau", Department of Labour File on Strikes and Lockouts, Vol. 310.

[77] Ottawa Journal Press, 7 March 1919.

[78] Canadian Labour Press, 24 January 1920.

[79] Journal Press, 7 March 1919.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid., 14 March 1919.

[82] Ibid., 7 March 1919.

[83] Department of Labour, File on Strikes and Lockouts, R.G. 27, Vol. 310.

[84] Journal Press, 6 March 1919.

[85] Department of Labour, File on Strikes and Lockouts, R.G. 27 Vol. 310.
[86] Journal Press 10 March 1919.
[87] The Typographical Journal, 1 June 1895.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid., July 15, 1895.
[90] Ibid., 7 March 1919.
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Gregory S. Kealey "'The Honest Workingman'", p. 49.
[96] Journal Press, 7 March 1919.
[97] Toronto World, 11 March 1919.
[98] Journal Press, 8 March 1919.
[99] Ibid., 14 March 1919.
[100] Ottawa Citizen, 14 March 1919.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Journal Press, 14 March 1919.
[103] Ottawa Citizen, 14 March 1919.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Quebec Chronicle, 8 March 1919.
[107] Journal Press, 14 March 1919.
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[109] Montreal Star, 7 March 1919.
[110] Journal Press, 21 March 1919; Ottawa Citizen, 21 March 1919.
[111] Ibid., 14 March 1919.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid., 8 March 1919.
[114] Canadian Labour Press, 11 October 1919.
[115] Ibid., 8 November 1919.
[116] Ibid., 15 November 1919; 5 June 1920.
[117] Patterson to Meighen, 22 March 1921, Meighen papers, Vol. 18.
[118] Journal Press, 7 March 1919.
[119] Department of Labour, File of Strikes and Lockouts R.G. 27, Vol. 310.
[20] Journal Press, 8 March 1919.
[121] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, pp. 30-31.
[122] The Civilian, Vol. XIII, No. 11 (October 1920), p. 436.

[123] L. White, "British Civil Service",p.

[124] Frankel, Staff Relations in the Civil Service of Canada, p. 23.

[125] R. M. Dawson, Civil Service, p.

[126] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 72.

[127] Civil Service News Vol. 1, No. 2 (21 August 1920), p. 3.

[128] Ibid., Vol. 1 , No. 3 (28 August 1920), p. 3.

[129] Canadian Civil Servant, Vol. 34, No. 9 (July 1955), p. 3.

[130] The Civilian, Vol XIII, No. 11 (October 1920), pp. 436- 437.

[131] Hodgetts, Biography of an Institution, p. 131.

[132] Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy: A Study of Canadian Civil Servants and Other Public Employees (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1949), p. 117.

[133] See George Bain, David Coates and Valerie Ellis, Social Stratification and Trade Unionism (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), for the view that there is no simple correlation between character, completeness and unionization, class position, and class consciousness.