Making Citizens in Magnaville
Katrina Refugees and Neoliberal Self-Governance

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I am not a "refugee." I wasn't shipped here... We are not refugees. You hold your head up. We are United States Citizens, and you be proud of that. A lot of us are taxpaying, honest, hardworking people. I'm like, when did I come from another country? That's what they used to call people that was in the boats, and that was sneaking over here. I am a survivor.

—Sharon White, New Orleans resident in Baton Rouge shelter, quoted on National Public Radio's All Things Considered, September 7, 2005

The people we're talking about are not refugees... They are Americans and they need the help and love and compassion of our fellow citizens.

—President George W. Bush, quoted during visit to shelter in Baker, Louisiana, September 2005

The 2008 film Trouble the Water was heralded as the best Katrina film in many corners for its first-person account of Kim Rivers Roberts's struggle to survive and rebuild her life after the waters consumed her Upper Ninth Ward neighborhood. The film stands out because filmmakers Tia Lessin and Carl Deal drive the narrative through Kim's priceless hand-held footage of the slow and catastrophic inundation of her neighborhood and the efforts of residents to save themselves. The film provides a more intimate account of government fa in corporate news coverage of the disaster vulnerability and disunity experienced by it invites further reflection about the pr in the redemption of contemporary neoli

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more intimate account of government failure than that circulated widely in corporate news coverage of the disaster. *Trouble the Water* reveals the vulnerability and disunity experienced by citizens in the United States, and it invites further reflection about the practices of citizenship and politics in the redemption of contemporary neoliberal sovereignty.

The film documents how, for the span of a week, thousands of the most vulnerable residents in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast were refugees. Kim and her fellow New Orleanians existed without the minimum protections one expects as a citizen in an advanced industrial society. On the contrary, Scott Roberts (Kim's husband) recounts a chilling episode in which he and dozens of other residents were turned away from a local naval support station at gunpoint when they sought refuge there. In another segment, Kim and Scott's fellow traveler, Brian Noble, is denied relief assistance in Memphis because he lived in a halfway house prior to the hurricane and could not produce an address for proof of residency. In one of the most powerful moments in the film, a relative of Kim puts words to the broader social predicament when she laments that the poor and the marginalized in America are in fact living without a government.

Kim, Scott, and Brian are honest and terribly likeable personalities. Their Katrina stories are told in a direct and unvarnished fashion. Each seems buoyed by the endurance that has developed from hard-scrabble lives (evidenced by the physical scars that adorn them and the deeper wounds reflected in their tales of love, violence, and loss) that predate the events of 2005, a deep faith in Christ, and the possibility of deliverance from earthly travails. *Trouble the Water* is uplifting because it overturns depictions of black New Orleanians as savages who resorted to murder, rape, and destruction during a time of crisis. Through each personal testimony of survivors, we glimpse the spirit of altruism and community that permeated many neighborhoods as the streets filled with water and 911 emergency calls went unanswered.

This film was a huge hit among art house patrons and activists, but it follows a plot arch of trouble, tragedy, and redemption that most American movie-going audiences have come to expect. The film's theme of redemption resonates with the Christian Right, Obamanistas, and antiwelfare conservatives alike. What is crucial to our argument in this chapter is that Kim and Scott must undergo a makeover as the film progresses. In a sense they are remade in the likeness of Middle America or at least an image that is more tolerable to the professed values of middle-class America. For much
of the film, they appear haggard and unkempt, but for the closing shots we find them made over, donning crisp attire, pearly white sneakers, carefully manicured dreadlocks, a salon-quality perm, and the like. This cosmetic makeover suggests a more fundamental ideological one: that ne’er-do-wells can assimilate to bourgeois culture if they are only given a chance. By the end of the film, Scott has secured a job working in construction, and Kim is working to promote her music career. And by extension, a society that failed so miserably to protect the lives of its most vulnerable citizens can in fact be redeemed through individualism and kind deeds. The film’s Christian undertones and the closing sequences move the narrative back toward the familiar ground of early twenty-first century American politics.

Given their commitments to labor politics, both Lessin and Deal obviously wish to portray New Orleans’ black working class with dignity. Lessin and Deal opt for cinéma vérité, which juxtaposes the Bush administration’s press maneuvers with on-the-ground (and underwater) experiences of survivors in order to underscore the gross negligence and hypocrisy of ruling elites. However, because the film operates primarily at the level of survivor testimony—a smarter version of the familiar human interest story common to corporate news media, this aesthetic choice leaves the lineaments of power shaping this disaster and the process of recovery largely unexplored. The film closes with a rousing brass-band performance amid a protest, but little information is revealed about the political content or intentions of this action, which was in fact a demonstration against the proposed demolition of public housing units in the city. The film’s plot arch might refract a different message: that the black urban poor can be made respectable. Therefore, although the film portrays flood victims with dignity, it forecloses the possibility of alternative lives for New Orleans’ laboring class, lives that transcend the crime, despair, and deprivation of urban poverty but also the insecurity, consumerism, and pretentiousness that accompany middle-class life.

This tension between vulnerability and redemption speaks to two broad themes we wish to address more fully in this chapter. First, the raw home-video footage and survivor stories testify how Americans have been made increasingly vulnerable by neoliberal governance—a refugee-like status was revealed and debated during the Katrina disaster. This status problematizes the fiction that the state is our protectorate and invites speculation into the contours of contemporary progressive politics and neoliberal sovereignty. Second, the film illustrates a contemporary sociopolitical desire to make citizenship ability created by neoliberalism irreversible forms of citizenship at its champions. In one of collective well-being, neoliberal citizenship responsibility. And even individual who that if one does not comply they will. the Water is a gateway into a broad isnic and mobilizing disaster stories in neoliberalism.

This chapter begins by revisiting the “refugee” to describe disaster victims revealed the inadequacy of civil rights of vulnerability and exclusion un semantics obscured the ways that K. ed to modes of self-governance inc. ed by international refugees flee disaster. In the remaining sections of neoliberal sovereignty, in rationality increasingly create exporter mobility, material comfort ing others. We note how states as gang warfare, and the like—increa opportunities to advance through active promotion of neo closing portion of this chapter exa a transitional residential settleme Frank Stronach—as an experimen

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sociopolitical desire to make citizens and citizenship work. The vulnerability created by neoliberalism is, ironically, to be solved by the very same forms of citizenship it champions. Instead of citizenship taking the form of collective well-being, neoliberal citizenship is rooted in individualizing responsibility. And even individual well-being is left to the persistent sense that if one does not comply they will become a refugee. In sum, Trouble the Water is a gateway into a broad sociopolitical process of assimilating and mobilizing disaster stories in the process of redeeming American neoliberalism.

This chapter begins by revisiting media debates over usage of the term “refugees” to describe disaster victims. We contend that such debates revealed the inadequacy of civil rights discourse for addressing new states of vulnerability and exclusion under neoliberalism. Arguments over semantics obscured the ways that Katrina survivors were in fact acclimated to modes of self-governance in a manner comparable to that experienced by international refugees fleeing state terror, civil war, and natural disaster. In the remaining sections of this chapter, we explore the unique terms of neoliberal sovereignty, in which private institutions and market rationality increasingly create expressions of meaningful citizenship in terms of mobility, material comfort, and security for some, while excluding others. We note how states of emergency—war, pandemic, disaster, gang warfare, and the like—increasingly provide the ruling classes with opportunities to advance their interests and attain popular legitimacy through active promotion of neoliberal modes of self-governance. The closing portion of this chapter examines one such project—Magnaville, a transitional residential settlement created by Canadian industrialist Frank Stronach—as an experiment in neoliberal citizen-making.

The “Refugees” Debate Revisited: Civil Rights Liberalism Meets Neoliberalism

As images of the mostly black, destitute, and desperate survivors were circulated internationally after the Katrina disaster, many newscasters and journalists referred to them as refugees. Some survivors were angered by the use of the term. Tyrone McKnight, a New Orleans resident who found shelter in Baton Rouge after the flood, rejected the implications of the term stating: “The image I have in my mind is people in a Third World country, the babies in Africa that have all the flies and are starving to
death. . . . That's not me. I'm a law-abiding citizen who's working every day and paying taxes." When asked about the use of the term refugees, Sharon White, who also evacuated to Baton Rouge, quipped, "A lot of us are taxpaying, honest, hardworking people. I'm like, when did I come from another country? That's what they use to call people that was in boats and that was sneaking over here. I am a survivor." Many Katrina evacuees responded in this manner, first disassociating themselves from the Third World connotations of the term and then making a claim to relief by reasserting themselves as liberal democratic citizens—hard-working, law-abiding, tax-paying. Black politicians like California Congresswoman Diane Watson and Maryland Congressman Elijah Cummings rejected the use of the term on similar grounds. And veteran civil rights leaders like Al Sharpton and Jesse Jackson appeared on numerous television programs to denounce the designation. Jackson charged that it was "racist to call American citizens refugees." However, the refusal to accept the term refugee on the basis of one's legal status as an American ignores actual practice.

The Katrina disaster set in motion the largest mass displacement in U.S. history, surpassing the Dust Bowl migrations of the 1930s in scale. Over the span of two weeks, more than one million evacuees were relocated to every state in the Union. For an outside observer who witnessed hours of footage of residents dying from heat exhaustion, dehydration, and the lack of adequate emergency services; others struggling to find basic necessities; and many other scenes of mass misery, the adamancy with which some rejected the term refugee might seem puzzling. Were Gulf coastal residents not experiencing the same realities of displacement, sheer need, and desperation seen elsewhere? New Orleans was, after all, a manifestation of the "Third World" in the "First," and the disaster was a violent reminder for many middle-class citizens in the United States that large-scale misery is a fact of real life and not merely the stuff of Grand Theft Auto, The Wire, and other slumdog fantasies.

The visceral reaction against the use of the term can only be understood within the context of late twentieth-century African American political development and the unchallenged centrality of civil rights liberalism within black public discourses from the 1970s onward. The rejection of Third World references among African American working people and elites reflects the triumph of liberal integrationist ideology over other visions of race advancement since the 1960s. The knee-jerk rejection of affiliation with the Third World gives the impression that the Black Power movement never had segregation buckled under the press of congressional civil rights acts, many of the Third World as an alternative. Third World was a utopian project: movements unfolding throughout the colonized world had a promise of being that promised Western cultural hegemony. Black revolutionary politics on domestic in the United States were, in fact, as leaders generally scoffed at these movements, choosing instead to confine the meaning of constitutional equal protection War liberal contradictions toward growth.

Black activists used similar claims after Katrina in an attempt to combat the current administration. Bush parried Hurricane Katrina as an "equal opportunity" happening, his administration's culpability the disaster. In many respects, the case has been rendered anachronistic, the Keynesian New Deal social contract as the global political economy. Multinational financial institutions are it real wages, population flows, labor reach of traditional levers of democracy.

Ironically, the mainstream press, refugee, was prescient in grasping the revelation revealed by the Katrina disaster. If the Associated Press, asserted "the appropriate to capture the sweep of the natural disaster on a vast number of the Times Communications Chief Cat term, noting its appropriateness experienced by survivors: "We have 'survivor,' 'displaced' and various other terms are seeing on the ground. Webster's person fleeing 'home and country"
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Ironically, the mainstream press, in defending its use of the term refugee, was prescient in grasping the reality of political vulnerability revealed by the Katrina disaster. Kathleen Carroll, executive editor of the Associated Press, asserted "the AP is using the term 'refugee' where appropriate to capture the sweep and scope of effects of this historic natural disaster on a vast number of citizens." In a similar vein, *New York Times* Communications Chief Catherine Mathis defined the use of the term, noting its appropriateness for describing the social realities experienced by survivors: "We have used ['refugee'] along with 'evacuee,' 'survivor,' 'displaced' and various other terms that fit what our reporters are seeing on the ground. *Webster's* [dictionary] defines a refugee as a person fleeing 'home and country' in search of refuge and it certainly
does justice to the legions driven from their homes by Katrina.” However, there is something more than semantics at stake in this term refugee.

Humanitarian Crises and Neoliberal Self-Governance

In times of emergency, the state is traditionally swept up in a wave of redemption. The emergency not only provides the opportunity to expand the governmental reach of the state but, equally important, also provides the necessary justification to normalize a geographically and historically contingent (and generally outdated) way of organizing political community and social life. In times of emergency, subjects are likely to lower their resistances to the injustices that the state enforces and become patriotic citizens willing, in some cases, to pay the ultimate sacrifice for the very instrument they previously challenged. Contrary to popular belief, therefore, those who support statecraft organize themselves around the next impending emergency, threat, or risk. Emergencies, threats, and risks (like crime, illness, and ignorance) do not complicate statecraft; they offer its core justification. The state form constitutes a complicated tension between taming and creating moments of its antipathy—a formless emergency. Following Giorgio Agamben, we call this the state of emergency. The state of emergency is simultaneously a suspension of state law and the moment in which the state reaches its greatest fulfillment. In this sense, there is a growing concern in contemporary political circles that the state of emergency is becoming the norm and not the exception. In this way, the character of our contemporary vulnerability is a normalized refuge.

In the wake of the Katrina emergency, given the U.S. government’s failure to respond to the threat of a Class 5 hurricane and the subsequent debacle of its response, we might ask, what is the status of the statecraft? Did the champions of statecraft fail to react? Did they react in a new way that does not fit with our conception of the way that government should work? In other words, is it possible that the U.S. government did not fail to respond to the emergency but instead is operating within a new logic, and that this is the real emergency? A new force was swept up in the tide of redemptions, thereby further complicating the logic of statecraft with the logic of the market. Jason Barker suggests that “unlike the recent past, the State is no longer under any pressure to respond to genuine antagonisms in order to justify the consolidation of empires. It simply does whatever it wants under the benign pretext of providing security for human beings in a world of infinite uncertainty.” In or respond to Katrina in this light, it is important.

Michael Dillon has argued that we are a shift as weighty as that marked by M. W. M. seminal work The Order of Things, in which emerged, the image of man might be war: The war on terror, the avian flu, the HIV financial crisis and the Mexico debt crisis hurricane and the Asian tsunami are all, if the organizing principles of modern polity between the principle of security (organize a populations and territory) and a global new image of life that exceeds the man and the rights of man. Building on Foucault, that politics is organized around manaq, Dillon argues that the traditional empirical risk have been amplified within a general of life, and therefore life’s new definitive circulations and connectivity. In other words, because it exists; it exists because it is iterations. Governance, therefore, is no longer the health of the nation (whatever that means) but the governance of contingency. Contingency and economy. A great transformation is ing organizing narratives have met the ernance, articulated biopolitically, group contingency of species being newly socially, politically and scientifically as ontologically emergent.” The end is not is under development.

Setting aside how this new life will gene therapy, biocomputing, preemptive transformation that Dillon identifies whether Katrina victims were refugees got in the way of political acumen w United States fought to label Katrina as argued that the refugee betrays the the protectorate. The desire to name
in a world of infinite uncertainty.” In order to understand the failure to respond to Katrina in this light, it is important to understand this new force.

Michael Dillon has argued that we are in the midst of a profound shift, a shift as weighty as that marked by Michel Foucault at the end of his seminal work *The Order of Things*, in which he predicts that as swiftly as it emerged, the image of man might be washed away like a face in the sand. The war on terror, the avian flu, the HIV and SARS epidemics, the Asian financial crisis and the Mexico debt crisis, and the response to the Katrina hurricane and the Asian tsunami are all symptoms of this profound shift in the organizing principles of modern political life. Dillon identifies the shift between the principle of security (organized around the maintenance of a populations and territory) and a global regime that is organized around a new image of life that exceeds the modern image of state citizenship and the rights of man. Building on Foucault and Agamben’s arguments that politics is organized around managing life and what life can mean, Dillon argues that the traditional emphasis on emergencies, threat, and risk have been amplified within a generalized contingency. This new image of life, and therefore life’s new definition, is contingency—a mixture of circulations and connectivity. In other words, life is no longer guaranteed because it exists; it exists because it is in the midst of circulating connections. Governance, therefore, is no longer organized around maintaining the health of the nation (whatever that means); instead, we are witnessing the governance of contingency. Contingency, he argues, now rivals society and economy. A great transformation is under way, in which the competing organizing narratives have met their match. He states, “Liberal governance, articulated biopolitically, grounds its freedom in an ontological contingency of species being newly understood and newly experienced socially, politically and scientifically as radically contingent because it is ontologically emergent.” The end is not yet in sight, but its transformation is under development.

Setting aside how this new life will be experienced scientifically (i.e., gene therapy, biocomputing, preemptive triage), the social and political transformation that Dillon identifies can be witnessed in the conflict over whether Katrina victims were refugees or émigrés. Political correctness got in the way of political acumen when the progressive forces in the United States fought to label Katrina refugees as émigrés. Agamben has argued that the refugee betrays the fiction of the state. The state is not your protectorate. The desire to name those displaced by the floodwaters
émigrés betrays the insight that at various historical moments blacks have not had a state to protect their interests, bodies, and futures. It would also be productive to read the history of blacks in America through the lens of the perpetual refugee/prisoner of war produced by the conquest of an entire continent and then of an entire population. In this light, Agamben’s pronouncement is chilling: “The camp is the space that is opened when the state of exception begins to become the rule.” America is a refugee camp that has become normalized for/by some and governed for/ by others. Nevertheless, the contemporary desire to relabel Katrina refugees as émigrés is more dangerously committed to maintaining a fiction of national citizenship. A refugee, Agamben argues, must be considered for what he [sic] is: nothing less than a limit concept that radically calls into question the fundamental categories of the nation state, from the birth nation to the man-citizen link, and thereby makes it possible to clear the way in which bare life is no long-overdue renewal of categories in service of a politics in which bare life is no longer separated and excepted, either in the state order or in the figure of human rights.10

In other words, “by breaking the continuity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality, … [the refugee puts] the originary fiction of modern sovereignty in crisis.”

As such, the Katrina emergency and the disappointment that most had with the U.S. government’s response (it should be noted that the international community, as it was with the Asian tsunami, was quick to offer aid in this humanitarian crisis) is indicative of a larger set of questions concerning the possibility of engaging in contemporary progressive politics. The proliferation of contingency and the parallel emergence of a circulatory and connective global assemblage constitute the contemporary terrain of political action.

In this sense, we can also say that the emergency provides an opportunity. Agamben’s pessimism that “when life and politics—originally divided, and linked together by means of the no-man’s land of the state of exception that is inhabited by bare life—begin to become one, all life becomes sacred (capable of being killed without it being murder) and all politics becomes the exception”11 is profound. However, it is precisely in such instances that traditional philosophical definitions of the political (i.e., deliberation, communication, and consensus) are replace politics. As Dillon argues, “If you wish to con so simply by taking issue with distributive ec imperializing practices or murderous prom omental life planet-wide: (as Rumsfeld sta in changing our way of life or we will succe midst of an emergency, a new politics must e ly, Alain Badiou states, “The essence of polit ion. It is the prescription of a possibility in a politics must be immanent to the practice it is important to understand those practices neoliberal sovereignty.

Setting aside the broader epistemic sovereignty and neoliberal sovereignty, we find sovereignty useful to understanding the lo Katrina. When the practices that constitute sovereignty are no longer the sole purview of the the express logic of the market, we can speak of liberal sovereignty. In this sense, it is the I the exception or, in other words, decides v Similarly, the market sets the conditions for good life of American citizenship is suppo sovereignty is becoming the norm in state practice In the American context, for example that decides whether a life is worth living ment organization (HMO) that decide receive treatment and which treatment that individuals of a society have the righ seded by a new opportunity to consume includes making choices about purchas this decision-making process, however, disciplinary apparatus. For example, we i and case studies (i.e., figuring out the pa class) infiltrating the curricula of the p School, we are told, needs to be made re oriented society-world. Similarly, studen to participate in charitable service bec society-world as they are to be encourag
communication, and consensus) are replaced with a creative practice of politics. As Dillon argues, “If you wish to contest biopolitics, you cannot do so simply by taking issue with distributive economy, geopolitical alliances, imperializing practices or murderously promoting of productively developmental life planet-wide: (as Rumsfeld stated) ‘they will either succeed in changing our way of life or we will succeed in changing theirs.” In the midst of an emergency, a new politics must emerge. Setting the stakes clearly, Alain Badiou states, “The essence of politics is not the plurality of opinion. It is the prescription of a possibility in rupture with what exists.” Such a politics must be immanent to the practices that it contests, and as such, it is important to understand those practices, or what we are exploring as neoliberal sovereignty.

Setting aside the broader epistemic similarities between state sovereignty and neoliberal sovereignty, we find an attention to neoliberal sovereignty useful to understanding the long-term reaction to Hurricane Katrina. When the practices that constitute, condition, and cajole citizenship are no longer the sole purview of the state and instead occur within the express logic of the market, we can speak about the emergence of neoliberal sovereignty. In this sense, it is the logic of the market that decides the exception or, in other words, decides what counts and what does not. Similarly, the market sets the conditions under which the training of the good life of American citizenship is supposed to occur. Neoliberal sovereignty is becoming the norm in state practice.

In the American context, for example, it is rarely the state nowadays that decides whether a life is worth living; instead, it is a health management organization (HMO) that decides whether an individual should receive treatment and which treatment should be given. The argument that individuals of a society have the right to good health has been superseded by a new opportunity to consume an active lifestyle, part of which includes making choices about purchasing HMO coverage. Cultivating this decision-making process, however, occurs in the early depths of a disciplinary apparatus. For example, we increasingly find corporate values and case studies (i.e., figuring out the profit margins of Pepsi Co. in math class) infiltrating the curricula of the public and private school system. School, we are told, needs to be made relevant to the realities of a market-oriented society-world. Similarly, students are as likely to be encouraged to participate in charitable service because of the value it gives to their society-world as they are to be encouraged because of the value it gives to
their resume or college applications. Gaining valuable experience, as such, occurs within a different register. The decision about whether you count or not, therefore, is increasingly narrated through individual consumer purchases (good insurance, quality education, nice neighborhood, and reliable friends) that often require short-term sacrifice for long-term gain.

Within this milieu, we can imagine the tension that would emerge if something beyond an individual’s consumer choice, like a hurricane, sets the horizon of potential individual action and responsibility. Old arguments that are tailored toward structural conditions of classism, racism, and sexism are heightened in an event that appears to arise from a geographic or historic elsewhere. The clash between the neoliberal individual and secured state subject, seen in the tension between naming victims refugees or émigrés explored previously, results in an important political moment. Rancière usefully explains that a political moment occurs when the normal distribution of appearances is disrupted by a voice/vision that could not be heard/seen before. The Katrina emergency, therefore, had the effect of renewing the vigor of these arguments by revealing the disjuncture between what has been promised and what has been actualized in the American experiment. In this political space, the hurricane became a social phenomenon (federal cutbacks left the levees weak, capitalist planning left the most disadvantaged in the most flood-prone zones of New Orleans). In the space of this disjuncture, neoliberalism needed to renew its credibility beyond hypocritically pointing out that the state (after cutbacks), once again, proved itself to be ineffective. If sovereignty is to have any purchase, then it must retain its standard as the most convincing mechanism for solving problems or disagreements between universal and particular needs and demands. Therefore, if something like neoliberal sovereignty is emerging, as such, its practices will be an attempt to bridge the breach.

"A Hand Up... Not a Hand Out": Neoliberal Self-Governance in Magnaville

In December 2005, when much of New Orleans still lay in fetid ruins, Frank Stronach literally pitched a revival tent to launch his new settlement for Katrina survivors. An Austrian native, Stronach was the colorful founder and chairman of Magna International, Inc., an auto-parts manufacturer worth over $20 billion as well as the now bankrupt Magna Entertainment Corporation (MEC), a racetrack and gamet, he and his right-hand man, form Dennis Mills, leapt into action. First, they one of Stronach's MEC horse training fac and later Stronach marveled his wealth ate a semipermanent settlement near Sir philanthropic projects undertaken in th might be described as benevolent neolite entail an ethical commitment to those i mote market-centric approaches to dis: inequality through the inculation of nec belongs to the same constellation of n Fryer's economic incentivization exper through Harvard University's Education Bronx native Geoffrey Canada's celebrat Father Greg Boyle's Homeboy Industri and employs gang members in small-sca parlors." These roll-out projects take u the welfare state and simultaneously a marginal, the excluded, and middle-clas the logical outgrowth of government c ortaken by New Democratic and Net George H. W. Bush's "Thousand Points the Temporary Assistance to Needy t enacted under Bill Clinton that remade ing, respectively, and George W. Bush's tives all used state power to spur mark a social need. Stronach's Magnaville was an assault on the public social safety net, institutions could respond quicker than the project served as a powerful ideolo tion. When he launched the Magnavil much fanfare, Stronach was clear about After a warm-up sermon from local Stronach took the microphone and pre and money. Magnaville would "fight " providing residents with the means merely concerned with providing shelt
Corporation (MEC), a racetrack and gaming company. As New Orleans flooded, he and his right-hand man, former Liberal Party Canadian MP Dennis Mills, leapt into action. First, they airlifted 260 New Orleanians to one of Stronach's MEC horse training facilities in Palm Springs, Florida, and later Stronach marshaled his wealth and social connections to create a semipermanent settlement near Simmesport, Louisiana. Like other philanthropic projects undertaken in the wake of Katrina, Magnaville might be described as benevolent neoliberalism. Such projects obviously entail an ethical commitment to those in need but simultaneously promote market-centric approaches to disaster relief and seek to manage inequality through the incalculation of neoliberal technologies. Magnaville belongs to the same constellation of neoliberal approaches as Roland Fryer's economic incentivization experiments on elementary students through Harvard University's Education Innovation Laboratory, South Bronx native Geoffrey Canada's celebrated Harlem Children's Zone, and Father Greg Boyle's Homeboy Industries in Los Angeles, which trains and employs gang members in small-scale enterprises like tattoo removal parlors. These roll-out projects take up the former social functions of the welfare state and simultaneously advance market-logics among the marginal, the excluded, and middle-class citizens alike. Such projects are the logical outgrowth of government outsourcing of social services undertaken by New Democratic and New Right politicians since Reagan. George H. W. Bush's "Thousand Points of Light" appeal to voluntarism, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Hope VI programs enacted under Bill Clinton that remade social provision and public housing, respectively, and George W. Bush's faith-based and community initiatives all used state power to spur market-based remedies to inequality and social need. Stronach's Magnaville was the beneficiary of this decades-long assault on the public social safety net, and by demonstrating that private institutions could respond quicker than government in moments of crisis, the project served as a powerful ideological justification of neoliberalization. When he launched the Magnaville project in December 2005 amid much fanfare, Stronach was clear about his intentions.

After a warm-up sermon from local black Baptist minister Joshua Dara, Stronach took the microphone and preached his own gospel of hard work and money. Magnaville would "fight poverty" according to Stronach, by providing residents with the means to self-reliance. Stronach was not merely concerned with providing shelter, but over the long haul, he hoped
this planned community that would also serve as a means of teaching values of autonomy and self-sufficiency. "You know the old saying," Stronach reminded the audience of new residents and underwriters, "if you give someone a fish, you feed them for a day. Teach them to fish and you feed them for a lifetime." Magnaville—or "Canadaville," as it is known to the locals—was constructed on 920 acres that had formerly been used for sugarcane farming near Simmesport, Louisiana. In a planning decision driven by either pure irony or cruel humor, Magnaville was built about 100 meters from a levee, near the northernmost reaches of the Atchafalaya River flood control system. The subdivision was designed by the Toronto-based architecture firms Giffels Associates and NORR. From December 2005 to January 2011 when it was disbanded, the settlement housed 150 residents in forty-nine prefabricated homes, each containing three bedrooms and two bathrooms. To execute their vision, Stronach and Mills drew on over fifty project partners, including Habitat for Humanity, Air Canada, Indigo Books, IBM, and Sharp Electronics.

Why did Stronach choose Simmesport, a small, isolated, and economically depressed town, to create his answer to the Katrina disaster? Why did he hire a reputable architectural firm like Giffels, with its dense portfolio of signature buildings and big-ticket projects, to design something so mundane? He could have purchased the same prefab "double-wides" at any dealer in south Louisiana. With the exception of the central square with its lush grove of live oak trees, the development is unremarkable. Why would he relocate these urban dwellers to an area without any of the amenities, cultural offerings, social contacts, etc., that many had known their entire lives?

Stronach biographer Wayne Lilley contends that Magnaville provided its creator with a much-needed wave of good publicity at a moment when Stronach's lobbying efforts for legalization of slot machines in Florida and California were being met with controversy and intense political opposition. Stronach's motivations, however, ran deeper than a short-run publicity stunt. Magnaville is the most mature manifestation of his standing ideological commitments to liberal capitalism. So the legend goes, Stronach arrived in Toronto with $200 and began his auto-parts empire as a humble garage operation. Although Magnaville may be his most ambitious effort at social engineering, this project and others (such as his investment in a vocational-technical school for low-income residents in Baltimore) all reflect his desire to help those in need. Given his legendary antiunion and anti-regulatory as an extension of Stronach's factories and in society more individualism and technique urban, industrial modes of so

By and large, residents Magnaville as a blessing. The dismal prospects of other such projects, Stronach's more or less rebuilding the lives of Katrina residents for the residents of pists and nongovernmental stonstration in decades to come

Oprah Winfrey's Angel Li vides an interesting compar is t projects undertaken by l committed to the promotion is less sophisticated and con disaster by providing exten victims during the week after style, she reframed the catast real and social roots. Instead, which reduced the storm vic of alienation to an emotional human-interest stories, lost ad nauseam. Surely, this app tion program and elic however, this framing was ty most personal and social chal New Age self-help and phlar

In the self-serving fash her post-Katrina relief proj group of disaster survivors were interviewing for a fi only to be treated to a "bi would all become neighbors Home Improvement provi families. Sixty-five people
of teaching old saying,” underwriters, each them to “Canadaville,” es that had for Louisiana. In a or, Magnaville most reaches bdivision was Associates and disbanded, the d homes, each te their vision, luding Habitat Electronics., and economi-disaster? Why its dense port-sign something “double-wides” central square unremarkable. hout any of the ny had known aville provided moment when lines in Florida ntense political than a short-run on of his stand-he legend goes, to-parts empire ay be his most ters (such as his me residents in en his legendary antiunion and antiregulatory posture, Magnaville might also be viewed as an extension of Stronach’s will to manage class contradictions in his factories and in society more generally, through the promotion of liberal individualism and techniques of self-governance that erode traditional urban, industrial modes of solidarity and collective action.

By and large, residents really see Stronach as a godsend and Magnaville as a blessing. They often compare their situation to the more dismal prospects of other survivors. Compared to similar philanthropic projects, Stronach’s more conscientious and substantial investment in rebuilding the lives of Katrina’s victims may have more long-term consequences for the residents of Magnaville and for the way that philanthropists and nongovernmental organizations approach postdisaster reconstruction in decades to come.

Oprah Winfrey’s Angel Lane subdivision outside Houston, Texas, provides an interesting comparison to Stronach’s Magnaville. Both are residential projects undertaken by billionaires and both benefactors are equally committed to the promotion of bourgeois subjectivity, but Oprah’s project is less sophisticated and conscientious. Oprah responded to the Katrina disaster by providing extensive and emotionally gripping coverage of the victims during the week after the storm made landfall. In her trademark style, she reframed the catastrophe in a manner that pruned away its political and social roots. Instead, she opted for a conventional journalistic style, which reduced the storm victims’ collective plight and shared experience of alienation to an emotionally overwhelming procession of disembodied human-interest stories, lost pets, bureaucratic snarls, and tearful reunions, ad nauseam. Surely, this approach riveted millions of viewers to her daily television program and elicited sympathy from onlookers. True to form, however, this framing was typical of the Oprah brand, which approaches most personal and social challenges of postindustrial life as curable through New Age self-help and philanthropic largesse.40

In the self-serving fashion that is her hallmark, Oprah unveiled her post-Katrina relief project on national television. She assembled a group of disaster survivors who were under the impression that they were interviewing for a finite set of Habitat for Humanity homes, only to be treated to a “big reveal,” where she announced that they would all become neighbors in the Angel Lane subdivision. Lowe’s Home Improvement provided toolboxes to the ecstatic and sobbing families. Sixty-five people were chosen to live in the subdivision. Each
household was expected to earn $1500 per month. If the homeowners missed three mortgage payments, they would lose their homes. As well, all residents were expected to be active participants in the homeowners’ association.

Little has been published about the fate of Angel Lane residents since its establishment. A February 2009 news story in the Houston Chronicle reported that Angel Lane was becoming overrun by crime and that some residents felt more vulnerable and fearful than they did in New Orleans. Despite her cultish popularity, Oprah’s efforts at social engineering have not been successful as of late. Angel Lane has apparently suffered the same fate as the Leadership Academy for Girls that Oprah established in South Africa, which was plagued by sexual abuse scandals. In comparison to Oprah’s poorly planned Angel Lane development, Magnaville featured much more extensive capital investment and a conscientious strategy for creating new lives for its residents.

Stronach’s project should be understood within the context of the new capitalist culture radically reshaping work, life, and leisure across the planet. In many respects, his approach to the social trauma and standing poverty of Katrina survivors was a civil society manifestation of his method of handling labor conflicts in his Magna factories. His approach to managing class contradictions in both instances is to displace conflicts through institutions that preempt working class solidarity and, instead, promote modes of consciousness and behavior that are amenable to his immediate interests and those of the investor class more generally. Like “quality circles,” worker discussion groups, and other forms of participatory management, the Magna model “empowers” workers in ways that do not threaten the power of management. Wayne Lewchuk and Don Wells have studied the managerial style used by Stronach’s Magna International plants, and they concluded that within the Magna model of industrial relations, redistributive conflicts are recast as opportunities for mutual gains through profit sharing. In a similar vein, the Magnaville settlement depoliticizes the drama of disaster and displacement and the progressively redistributive claims that might arise through public-spirited discussion and activism. Stronach scores points as a corporate giant who cares for the least of these. His plan entailed a more extensive effort to mold displaced New Orleanians into citizens whose labors and aspirations were commensurate with market logics.

Stronach’s project reflects all the best “ameliorate” poverty. His plan was to reframe the problem of poverty and create mixed-income logic being that class contact would be reduced and provide them with an incentive in behavioral modification. The Katrina disaster was still difficult for some to understand the source of the underclass myth. The University of California–Berkeley Fellow John McWhorter both as a black person from the suburbs who has written on the racial nature of poverty, etc., wrote about the poverty and state divestment in his capacity to act independently.

Fueled by the mass-mediated legends, right-wing arguments about welfare and, in some corners, columnist David Brooks pointed out in a September 8, 2005, opinion “has given us an amazing chance to change poverty.” For Brooks and many the United States provided an opportunity to change poverty and to test hypotheses in circulation among social scientists. Brooks argues, “The only chance is to integrate people who lack a chance with skills that people possess these skills and behavior.” Liberals took up this.

The Urban Sociology Section circulated a petition titled, “Hurricane Katrina.” Led by William J. Johnson and an “historic opportunity to lift
Stronach’s project reflects all the conventional thinking about how to best “ameliorate” poverty. His plan to relocate black urban dwellers to a pastoral setting was guided by assumptions about “deconcentrating poverty” that were forcefully articulated in the aftermath of the disaster. A derivative of underclass discourse, this argument suggests that housing policy efforts targeting the poor should be designed to break up zones of poverty and create mixed-income neighborhoods, with the underlying logic being that class contact would end the social isolation experienced by the poor and provide them with middle-class modeling and guidance in behavioral modification. Even as the on-the-ground reporting of the Katrina disaster was still difficult and patchy, right-wing commentators began to explain the sources of the tragedy in the language of the underclass myth. The University of Maryland’s Douglas Besharov and University of California–Berkeley professor and Manhattan Institute Fellow John McWhorter both asserted that those who died or were left stranded on rooftops were not the victims of a natural disaster, institutional racism, or state divestment but rather the victims of a culture of welfare dependency, especially acute in New Orleans, that discouraged their capacity to act independently even in times of extreme duress.\(^3\)

Fueled by the mass-mediated images of destitution and wild urban legends, right-wing arguments about poverty maintained their preflood hegemony and, in some corners, gained new converts. New York Times columnist David Brooks pointed out the “silver lining” of this disaster. In a September 8, 2005, opinion piece, Brooks wrote that that hurricane “has given us an amazing chance to do something serious about urban poverty.”\(^5\) For Brooks and many others, the dispersion of evacuees across the United States provided an opportunity to “break up zones of concentrated poverty” and to test hypotheses about cultural integration that have been in circulation among social scientist and policy makers for decades. Brooks argues, “The only chance we have to break up the cycle of poverty is to integrate people who lack middle class skills into neighborhoods with people who possess these skills and who insist on certain standards of behavior.”\(^4\) Liberals took up this rhetoric as well.

The Urban Sociology Section of the American Sociological Association circulated a petition titled, “Moving to Opportunity in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina.” Led by William Julius Wilson and Xavier Briggs, the petitioners echoed Brooks’s language as they described the hurricane as an “historic opportunity to lift thousands of the nations’ most vulnerable
families out of ghetto poverty and the associated physical and social
risks...so vividly illustrated in recent weeks. The petition goes on to
reference a “growing body of scientific research” that demonstrates that
“moving to lower poverty, lower risk neighborhoods and school districts
can have significant positive effects on the well-being and economic
opportunity of low-income children and their families.” The petitioners
claim that they “do not seek to depopulate the city [of New Orleans] or its
historically black communities,” but the overall thrust of the petition tends
to override this disclaimer. The petition makes no mention of the grassroots
efforts that were being waged by public housing tenants and advocates in
New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast.

Although the deconcentration argument has been taken up by conser-
vatives and New Democrats as a pretext for the razing of public housing
stock, such arguments have their origins in mid-twentieth-century
criticisms of the scalar, social, and design problems of U.S. housing for
the poor. When large cities like Chicago erected massive tower blocks
during the 1950s, left liberals and radicals were quick to scrutinize the
underlying regulatory posture, racially segregative logic, and other prob-
lems associated with warehousing the urban minority poor in large-scale
public housing tracts.” Contemporary adoptions of the deconcentra-
tion argument, however, are most often alloyed with revanchist motives.
In a searing critique of the petition circulated by Briggs and Wilson,
Adolph Reed Jr. and Stephen Steinberg argue that the deconcentration
rhetoric advances an ulterior agenda that benefits local developers more
than the poor. They note that the “Moving to Opportunity” strategy “is
not part of a comprehensive policy to attack poverty and racism: to rid
the United States of impoverished ghettos that pockmark the national
landscape. Rather the policy is enacted in places where poor blacks
occupy valuable real estate.” The “Moving to Opportunity” discourse,
like most discussions of poverty since the Great Society era, tends to por-
tray the ghetto as an aberration within liberal democratic society, rather
than a constituent element of capitalist social organization. The ghetto
is not represented as a community that can be rebuilt, transformed, or
renewed but rather as a zone that must be razed, escaped, avoided, or
policed. In effect, this discourse reproduces the commonsensical notion
that the black urban poor are the objects of elite overtures and benevo-
ence rather than independent agents possessing political will. Never do
the poor themselves enter into these narratives as subjects in history.

What is especially insidious about opportunity through dispersion, es-
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What is especially insidious about this broader rhetoric of creating opportunity through dispersion, especially when applied to Magnaville, is that many of its residents were not poor before the flood. Carl Tipton, a retired school teacher and former professional football player, and his wife, Gwen, were among the first residents. In much post-Katrina public discourse, the terms “poor,” “black,” “flood victim,” “evacuee,” and “refugee” are used interchangeably and strung together in ways that discourage more accurate, nuanced analysis of the political-economy of this particular disaster and sideline any effective way of discerning comparative harm and claims to redress.

Unlike Brad Pitt’s Make It Right Foundation, which aims to rebuild 150 sustainable homes for residents of the lower Ninth Ward, projects like Magnaville, Oprah’s Angel Lane, and the “adoption” of Katrina victims by local churches all construe the relocation of New Orleanians from the city to suburban and rural locations as unqualified progress. Obviously, some Magnaville residents appreciated the calm, quiet nights of rural South Louisiana. One promotional video featured footage of kids at play and suggests that, unlike their past lives in crime-ridden New Orleans, families can allow their children to play unattended. No gunshots, no drama, no worries. Some residents welcome the clean air and open space of the pastoral setting, but others express nostalgia for New Orleans, and after a stint in Magnaville, some returned to the city, citing the difficulty transitioning to the slower-paced lifestyle, finding employment, and adjusting without the kinship networks and rich social bonds that made New Orleans home. Their exodus reveals the patent limitations of the Magnaville settlement.

Beyond its closeness to nature and “peace and quiet,” Magnaville, as a housing development, was deeply antiurban and not guided by the kinds of best practices that might create a rich social life for its residents. Magnaville was designed to transform them from urban dwellers into modern-day yeomen. Gone were the grid street network, sidewalks, public transit, and other amenities Magnaville’s residents were accustomed to in New Orleans. These streets were not made for walking, and furthermore, there was nowhere to walk to. Magnaville was isolated from Simmesport’s existing residential neighborhoods, designed to be a relatively self-contained community like other suburban developments and small-town trailer parks, with a playground, basketball courts, and a baseball diamond. The underlying message here is that cities, the loci
of social innovation, creativity, and civilization for millennia, are no
longer necessary or desirable. This latter-day North American disdain for
all things urban takes physical form in Magnaville.

The subdivision eschews the most common global, urban form
of cohabitation, the apartment building, in favor of the single-family,
detached home. Even Brad Pitt’s Make It Right project incorporates
some more flexible dwellings that accommodate a granny flat or small
apartment at the rear, which can offer some autonomy to an adult
member of a blended family or serve as a source of income for the
principal tenant. Architecturally, Magnaville falls somewhere between
the middle-twentieth-century Levittowns constructed in Long Island
and Pennsylvania and a FEMA trailer park. It fuses the suburban biases
and industrial monotony of the former with the transitory aesthetics and
conservative politics of the latter. The site selection, land use practices, and
exclusive use of single-family homes reassert postwar suburban housing
as normative. The choice of “double-wides” over newly constructed
homes or renovated ones also embodies the same neoliberal logic
that guided the creation of workfare and the continued use of FEMA
trailers when more durable dwellings, like Katrina Cottages, could be
produced for less cost. The underlying message here, written in vinyl
siding and pressure-treated lumber, is that too much charity, especially
when guaranteed by the state, will undermine the self-reliance and moti-
vation of the poor. The sensory landscape of Magnaville communicates
that its residents should be grateful, but they should not be contented
with their new surroundings. They should aspire to something more.

Stronach’s vision was to create a community of self-sustaining individu-
als. Residents were provided rent for the first five years, and during that
time period, each would be expected to contribute to the community
through various forms of unpaid service. Stronach and his collaborators
hoped to create an organic farm manned by residents that would supply
fresh produce to Whole Foods supermarket. They enlisted Calvin Walker,
a professor of animal science at Southern University–Baton Rouge, and
Sustainable Innovations, Inc. in the hopes of creating Louisiana’s first
organic poultry and pork operation and developing future plans for meat
processing and beef production.

Some critics took issue with the idea of work requirements for
residents, charging that over the benevolent aspects of Stronach’s
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Conclusion

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was eerily similar to the system of debt peonage whose ghosts still haunt the memories of blacks throughout the lower Mississippi Delta. Walker rebuffed these claims that Magnaville’s work requirements were a Jim Crow throwback, saying, “Anyone who makes jokes about slavery is just ignorant.” It is not surprising that he would defend Magnaville in this way, given his own immediate interests in the project’s success as a researcher and beneficiary of consulting contracts. As a matter of historical interpretation, however, Walker is correct. Magnaville is neither the Parchman Farm nor the former sugar plantation that once stood there. Long gone are the most brutal forms of vigilante violence and legal apartheid that subordinated black peasants to the interests of the Southern planter class for a century from the fall of Reconstruction to the civil rights reforms of the Johnson administration. As a rhetorical strategy, reference to sharecropping can be powerful, but as historical analysis, it is not. The analogy calls attention to the implicit power dynamics in the project but fails to clarify the nature of these arrangements.

In a video-recorded statement for Magnaville’s first anniversary, former Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco lauded Stronach and Magnaville for giving evacuees a hand up rather than a hand out. The strategy here is one of rehabilitation. How might lower-income city dwellers reach their fullest market potential? The Magnaville project’s work prescriptions, pastoral setting, and attempts to create a profitable organic farm were intended to cultivate an entrepreneurial spirit—a new way of life that may offer some measure of economic independence and self-sufficiency to the residents.

Conclusion

The Magnaville project officially ended on Friday, January 7, 2011, as the last residents were nudged off the property. Technically, they were given the option of remaining in their homes at the cost of $500 per month (plus, a $500 deposit), but such a rental rate was hardly feasible given that so many had failed to find consistent work in the Simmesport area. One month before Magnaville ended its rent-free phase, the Chicago Housing Authority closed the last remaining building in the notorious Cabrini-Green public housing complex in the city’s gentrified Near North Side. The discontinuation of both public housing and Stronach’s exercise in disaster relief is predicated on the same neoliberal model of social
engineering. Stronach's five-year experiment, like the public housing reforms and workfare policies that began during the Clinton years, was predicated on the view that social provision should not be open-ended if it is to spur independence among the poor. The literal success of the Magnaville project—whether Stronach and Mills actually created new yeomen citizens out of New Orleans expatriates—may be less significant than the ideological work that this project has already accomplished. The Magnaville launch provided Stronach with good publicity, but more substantially, the fulsome praise of the project by government officials, flood victims, and reporters legitimated the neoliberal claim that private institutions and philanthropy are better suited to undertake social redress than the state.

Projects like Magnaville and Angel Lane are forms of benevolent neoliberalism that attempt to manage inequality and social misery by advancing market logics. These projects are benevolent in their immediate effects, but they bear an ideological dimension that is socially pernicious. Charter schools, like Chicago's Urban Prep Academy for African American boys, are cherished by local communities for producing results—safer learning environments, higher graduation rates, increased numbers of college-bound students, and a renewed sense of possibility among students, teachers, and the wider community. Such schools, which wed public funding and private management, however, are limited in scope and social impact, and yet, they are often deployed as a weapon to further erode universal, public education in favor of increased privatization. As Adrienne Dixson's contribution to this volume illustrates in the case of New Orleans schools after Katrina, charterization often sacrifices access, deliberation and transparency, and the collective-bargaining rights of teachers and staff in the interest of delivering a better "product" and "customer service." Such neoliberal roll-out projects are further legitimated at the level of everyday life, as the livelihoods and economic security of various beneficiaries—the poor, the unemployed, low-wage workers, and disaster victims but also middle-class researchers, students, politicians, grantees, etc.—are hitched to private funding streams and market logics as the state's role in social service delivery fades from view. The philanthropy of entertainers such as Stronach, Céline Dion, Oprah Winfrey, and Sean Penn and that of nongovernmental organizations, such as Habitat for Humanity, Phoenix of New Orleans, and dozens of others, is made all the more valuable in the context of government divestiture. Rhetoric of these organizations ran administration failure to overt actions on the emergent phenomenon of bi capitale, disenchanted liberals, a advance a project of empowerment.

Herein lies a conundrum for organizing against forms of privatization that feel good or right for the challenge philanthropic projects cation in lieu of public alternatives concept like citizenship if it now f lems that it used to solve? More self-responsibility are used to do or they (with limits) were able to ac remade, therefore, not solely by w ism (e.g., the clandestine handi Halliburton, etc.) but by do-good Facehook and Twittered labors and mercurial student volunteer contest. The popular mode misses the more subtle but no le governmentality that advances m Such pressure often unwittingly ism's advance. Wal-Mart's cartoon one are easy targets, but the new formidable adversary.

Notes
the context of government divestiture in public amenities. The political
rhetoric of these organizations ranges from left liberal criticism of Bush
administration failure to overt endorsements of privatization. Within
the emergent phenomenon of benevolent neoliberalization, stalwart
capitalists, disenchanted liberals, and millennial do-gooders converge to
advance a project of empowerment through individual self-help.

Herein lies a conundrum for the post-Seattle left: How does one
organize against forms of privatization engaged in “good works,” activities
that feel good or right for those who participate? How does one
challenge philanthropic projects that provide relief, shelter, and edu-
cation in lieu of public alternatives? How do we politicize a cherished
concept like citizenship if it now functions to reproduce the very
problems that it used to solve? More participation, individual action, and
self-responsibility are used to dismantle the collective promises that
they (with limits) were able to achieve. Much of New Orleans is being
remade, therefore, not solely by what Naomi Klein terms disaster cap-
italism (e.g., the clandestine handiwork of Pinochet, the Chicago School,
Halliburton, etc.) but by do-good capitalism (e.g., the heavily publicized,
Facebooked and Twittered labors of celebrity socialites, church groups,
and mercurial student volunteers) that is more difficult to politicize
and contest. The popular mode of left criticism, however, habitually
misses the more subtle but no less consequential aspects of neoliberal
governmentality that advances market-logic at the level of everyday life.
Such pressure often unwittingly has the effect of furthering neoliberal-
ism’s advance. Wal-Mart’s cartoonish smiley face and Bush’s bewildered
one are easy targets, but the new convivial face of capitalism is a more
formidable adversary.

Notes

1. Quoted in Robert E. Pierre and Paul Farhi, “‘Refugee’: A Word of Trouble,”

2. Michelle Norris, “Katrina Survivors Contemplate Whether to Go Home,”
All Things Considered, September 7, 2005, online transcript, http://www.npr.org/

(accessed January 25, 2010).


11. Ibid., 131.

12. Ibid., 148.

13. Here we are siding with Alain Badiou’s critique of political philosophy; see Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. Jason Barker (New York: Verso, 2005).


16. Thomas Watson, a senior writer at Canadian Business, reported on the five-year anniversary of the Magnaville settlement. He captured the wide-ranging entrepreneurial and personal pursuits and voracious ambition of Magnaville’s benefactor: "As corporate Canada’s self-styled philosopher king, Stronach has always been a larger-than-life entrepreneur that some people just can’t help kicking around. Even a few Magna loyalists joke that the boss is a visionary with an attention-span disorder. When not focused on expanding his $20-plus-billion autoparts conglomerate or breeding one of the world’s largest stables of thoroughbreds, Stronach has tried his hand at a wide range of ventures. Over the years, he has opened a disco, run a restaurant, published an alternative business magazine, launched an energy drink, tried building a massive amusement park in Vienna, proposed an airline for the rich, tried transforming prestigious racetracks into entertainment destinations for the masses, and attempted to beat Magna’s car-making customers at their own game. The man’s nonbusiness activities range from managing the Austrian soccer league to running for a seat in Ottawa (where he planned to push for radical parliamentary reforms)." See Thomas Watson, “Magnaville’s Unfinished Dream,” Canadian Business,
Power and the Making of Minnesota, 2007); Vijay Third World (New York: Martin, and Fanon Che national Since the Age of ess, 2007).


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24. Ibid.


26. Jane Jacobs offers one such critique of the socially isolating character of public housing design in mid-twentieth century America. She writes: "One of the unsuitable ideas behind projects is the very notion that they are projects,
abstracted out of the ordinary city and set apart. To think of salvaging or improving projects, as projects, is to repeat this root mistake. The aim should be to get that project, that patch upon the city rewoven back into the fabric—and in the process of doing so, strengthen the surrounding fabric too” [emphasis original]; Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1993), 511; see also Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998 [1983]); and Sudhir Venkatesh, American Project: The Rise and Fall of Modern Ghetto (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).

